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Founded by Harold Wilson in 1972, and formerly the Labour Finance and Industry Group, Labour 
Business is one of 20 Socialist Societies formally affiliated to the UK Labour Party. Labour Business is 
the bridge between the Labour Party and the business and finance communities. It is a voice for the 
Party within the business community, and a voice for the business community within the Party. Its 
mission is to establish Labour as the natural party of business by advocating a partnership between 
government, businesses, and trade unions for a new and more sustainable kind of economic growth. 
Our activities include business engagement, policy development, media outreach, and member events. 
We work closely with the Labour Front Bench and Backbenchers in Parliament, with Labour City 
Mayors, with Labour Councillors, and with Labour Party units nationally and regionally on business 
engagement and policy development. We have a federal structure which allows members to participate 
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I am pleased to welcome the publication of this important report, Towards Democratic and 
Sustainable Business: Possibilities for Corporate Governance Reform, by Chris Rees and David 
Offenbach, both members of our Industry & Business Policy Group. 
 
This report is not the policy of the Labour Party or of Labour Business, but both will subscribe to 
many of the ideas it discusses. As Covid-19 has shown, governments in the future will have to 
accept a more active role in the economy. In this context, the regulatory framework for corporate 
governance will need to be adapted to support economic growth and encourage responsible 
business practices. This report provides a route for how the Labour Party in office might begin to 
bring this about. 
 
Labour Business hopes that this report will make a valuable contribution to the policy making 
process of the Labour Party as it develops a radical and reforming programme for government. 
 
Hamish Sandison 








The Covid-19 pandemic has precipitated a deep and lasting economic crisis, adding to the on-going 
aftershocks of the 2008 financial crisis. Whilst the challenge is immense, any long-term recovery 
strategy must be premised upon working towards a more inclusive and sustainable economy, with 
greater resilience for the future. Within this context, it is widely understood that governments will 
have to accept a more active role in the economy. Legal and regulatory frameworks will need to 
adapt in response to rapidly changing expectations. The task for the Labour Party is to begin to 
develop a transformative agenda for government that will facilitate this new economy. 
 
Over the past decade, unregulated free-market capitalism has been increasingly challenged, and 
there have been widespread calls for a more ‘responsible capitalism’. We argue there is a crucial role 
here for effective state intervention through company law reform. This will necessitate the 
corporate governance framework being re-configured to support responsible business, facilitate the 
delivery of long-term and sustainable economic growth, and provide an overarching regulatory 
framework within which good businesses can thrive.  
 
This report considers a series of legal changes aimed at improving the monitoring, transparency, 
accountability, and effectiveness of corporate power. Specifically, we advocate changes to the 
corporate governance regime to promote workforce voice in company decision-making, together 
with changes to the rules governing company ownership and purpose to create companies focussed 
on long-term, sustainable success, shared by all their stakeholders. The democratization of the 
company must be fundamental to this effort. A democratic and sustainable society requires 
democratic and sustainable businesses. That is the key message of this report.  
 
The report outlines the rationale and principles behind a series of broad policy areas, drawing from a 
review of recent academic and policy-oriented literature. We place policy proposals in the context 
of the wider political economy, explaining the role of financialization and the marketization of the 
corporate governance regime. Our focus is on the key actors in corporate governance – 
shareholders, directors, employees – as well as certain aspects of the broader regulatory 
architecture for business. In summary, we consider the potential for reform across several areas, 
and we argue for: 
 
 a reformulation of the purpose of the company 
 a shift away from shareholder primacy to a more stakeholder-driven governance model 
 greater democracy in company governance and decision-making 
 revisions to the role of shareholders and investors 
 stronger regulatory mechanisms for corporate sustainability 
 a recasting of the incentives and duties of company directors 
 greater democracy and transparency in executive pay 
 more diverse and inclusive company boards 
 enhanced employee voice and consultation within company decision-making 
 the promotion of new corporate forms and governance structures 
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 a range of enforcement mechanisms and a coherent regulatory overlay to shift the 
governance framework in a more pluralistic and stakeholder-oriented direction 
 
The report has sought to establish some of the options for reform, point to those policy areas that 
will need attention from a progressive Labour government, and help to provide a narrative and 
vocabulary for taking these arguments forward. The challenge for the Labour Party is to advance a 
renewed vision of democratic socialist reform, with an active state working in partnership with 
businesses, workers, and their trade unions. Attitudes towards capitalism and the role of business 
are shifting rapidly. Labour must show itself to be leading and shaping that argument. This begins 
with the articulation of a principled and pragmatic agenda for change. 
  
 




In March 2020, a rapidly developing public health emergency triggered a sudden, severe, and 
deliberate contraction of the real economy. We now face a three-way crisis. The current health crisis 
has precipitated an economic crisis, against the backdrop of an already existing climate crisis. 
Finding an adequate response to these crises is an immense challenge. As a wide range of voices 
has argued, any post Covid-19 recovery strategy must be premised upon working towards a more 
inclusive and sustainable economy, with greater resilience for the future (CommonWealth, 2020; 
IPPR, 2020; NEF, 2020; TUC, 2020).  
 
Within the coming period, the task for the left will be to develop an agenda for government that will 
facilitate a new economy, rather than simply continuing the inequalities of the old. If successful, this 
may presage a potentially transformative juncture – a ‘1945 moment’. Churchill may have been said 
to have won the war, but Attlee’s Labour government won the peace. Labour’s finest government 
so far created the NHS, established universal education, funded local authority care homes, 
nationalised the mines and railways, and built 400,000 new council homes per annum. And this was 
in spite of a national debt to GDP ratio more than twice as high as at present. As then, progress now 
will depend upon political will married to the democratic consent of the people. In 2020 the Labour 
Party must begin to generate the same sense of common purpose to win support for a programme 
of far reaching transformation. 
 
The response to the current crisis must be different to the response to the 2008 financial crisis. 
Without effective policy interventions, we will likely see a further consolidation in ownership, with 
distressed firms purchased on the cheap by large corporations and private equity, accelerating the 
concentration of wealth and power (CommonWealth, 2020; Dobbins, 2020). The objective must be 
to avoid these negative aspects of unrestrained capitalism whilst still encouraging business 
competitiveness and a more productive economy. Indeed, it is precisely the need to achieve 
economic growth that necessitates a focus on the effective regulation of business. Everything 
proposed by the Labour Party must be ‘pro-good business’ in the widest sense, but not ‘business as 
usual’. There needs to be fresh thinking on how to develop a partnership of government, 
businesses, workers, and their trade unions, to drive fairness at work and sustainable economic 
growth. This will require significant reform across many areas, including company law and 
employment law.  
 
The government has already played a vital role in supporting firms through the immediate Covid-19 
period. The Future Fund 2020 has been established for start-up companies, borrowing between 
£125k and £5m from the government, matched by private investment. By June 2020 the 
government had lent £16billion to the Bank Of England Covid Corporate Financing Facility scheme. 
Helping businesses is vital in the present crisis, but it is not clear whether the public interest has 
been sufficiently protected here. Conditionality is required, not in a punitive way, but in a way that 
lays the foundations for the kind of economy that we want to see develop over the next decade – 
namely one that is more inclusive, democratic, and sustainable (Mazzucato, 2020; NEF, 2020). For 
this to happen, state support must lead to changes in corporate priorities and practices. We must 
learn from the mistakes of the 2008 crisis, when government bailouts simply allowed firms to reap 
even higher profits once the crisis abated. This time we need to find ways to embed democracy and 
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sustainability in the way corporations operate. This report considers how far corporate governance 
reform can contribute to that effort. 
 
If the government is to avoid distributing unconditional subsidies to ailing companies, one option is 
for taxpayer money to be used to purchase an equity stake. The principle of a public equity stake for 
public investment is self-evident. If the government provides risk capital then it too must share in 
the profits of the enterprise, just like any shareholder. Equity taken should be held as a strategic, 
permanent, public stake to create a powerful form of leverage and grow public wealth in the long 
term (CommonWealth, 2020). We note with approval the announcement on 3rd July 2020 that the 
government will take an equity stake of £400m in the satellite firm OneWeb. Government stakes in 
private business could be used to inaugurate a new UK sovereign wealth fund, as in other countries, 
with the profits generated used for public purposes. Sovereign wealth funds can be immensely 
successful, as in Norway, for example. This new form of government revenue from part-ownership 
would bolster state capacity, mitigating the need for further austerity measures, whilst also giving 
the state steering powers to influence business practices, such as efforts to advance 
decarbonisation (Bailey, 2020). 
 
Aside from this level of strategic intervention, in terms of the regulation of business there has been 
growing recognition of the need for a new and more progressive approach to corporate governance 
in the UK (Lawrence, 2017; Talbot, 2016; TUC, 2014; Veldman et al., 2016). Following the 2008 
financial crisis, unregulated free-market capitalism has been increasingly challenged, and there 
have been widespread calls for a more ‘responsible capitalism’ (Hockman, 2012, 2014). Over the 
past decade there has been continuing evidence of a lack of public trust in business, a culture of 
rising executive pay, short-termism in corporate decision-making, low re-investment, stagnant 
wages, and poor productivity (IPPR, 2018; Johnstone et al., 2019). More recently we have witnessed 
a series of corporate scandals and controversies: examples include BHS, a privately-held chain of 
clothing stores, which failed in June 2016 with a pension fund deficit of £571m; Sports Direct, a 
chain of listed sports apparel stores, which admitted using oppressive workplace practices, and 
agreed in 2017, under intense pressure, to put an employee representative on its board; Carillion, a 
multinational construction services company, which went into liquidation in 2018 accused, among 
other things, of prioritising shareholder dividends over the funding of the pension scheme; and 
GKN, one of Britain’s oldest manufacturing companies, subject to a hostile takeover in 2018 by a 
‘financial engineering’ firm known for asset stripping and workforce reductions (in terms of this 
latter case, we intend that a further report will consider how the law on takeovers can be reformed 
to promote long-termism in corporate management and the better protection of the public 
interest). 
 
More is now being asked of the UK corporate governance regime to address and ameliorate some 
of the problems these cases have highlighted (Haldane, 2016; ICSA, 2017), and there is significant 
analysis and debate concerning the fundamental purpose of the corporation (British Academy, 
2019; NEF, 2017). In this report we argue that businesses can only do so much on a voluntary basis, 
and the more enlightened employers also face significant constraints in how far they are able to be 
progressive in this area. As a result, there is a crucial role for effective state intervention through 
company law reform. We consider a series of legal changes aimed at improving the monitoring, 
transparency, accountability, and effectiveness of corporate power. Specifically, this will require 
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changes to the corporate governance regime to promote workforce voice in company decision-
making, together with changes to the rules governing company ownership and purpose to create 
companies focussed on long-term, sustainable success, shared by all their stakeholders.  
 
As this agenda gathers pace, an important shift also appears to be under way in corporate America. 
The largest US business group (the Business Roundtable) has replaced the long-held view that 
maximising shareholder value is the defining corporate purpose with a more inclusive vision that 
takes account of other stakeholders. This encapsulates a major change in thinking, explicitly 
elevating broader interests such as those of employees, the environment, and customers, in an 
effort to set a new standard for companies across the US. However, whilst this is a most welcome 
development, it remains only a voluntary statement. In the UK, the task for the next Labour 
government must be to enshrine these principles in legislation, as recent experience shows us that 
voluntary codes and industry statements, and the continued tweaking of soft law instruments, have 
not prevented poor company management.  
 
The democratization of the company must be fundamental to this effort. A democratic and 
sustainable society requires democratic and sustainable businesses. That is the key message of this 
report. There is therefore a need to address both the issue of ownership (relating to shareholder 
rights, as well as the ownership claims of employees), and the issue of decision-making (to promote 
more democratic corporate structures incorporating a wider range of voices within the firm, and 
also to develop legal structures which allow for greater stakeholder engagement with business 
more broadly). This report focusses on how these issues might be addressed through company law 
reform. We intend that a further report will consider the contribution of employment law reform 
(examining workers rights and the enhancement of democracy at the level of the firm through trade 
unions and collective bargaining). 
 
We argue that a raft of reforms is necessary to the corporate governance of companies, both 
private and publicly quoted, to support entrepreneurial activity, encourage new long-term 
investment, increase investor confidence, and repurpose companies to take account of a wider 
range of stakeholder interests. In summary, we advance a series of key principles and proposals: 
 
 A new partnership is needed between government, business, and trade unions to drive 
economic recovery and growth. This should involve a reformulation of the purpose of the 
company, with the rationale for business understood as being to serve stakeholders and the 
public interest. 
 
 The UK corporate governance regime should be reoriented away from shareholder primacy 
to support a long-term and sustainable approach to company success, and to encourage 
more democracy in company governance and decision-making. 
 
 Shareholders should only have entitlements commensurate with their commitment and 
legal responsibilities. This means challenging ‘enlightened shareholder value’ and 
encouraging a more stakeholder-driven governance and ownership model. 
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 Within this, a nuanced approach would distinguish between the interests and activities of 
different investors, tackling those institutions (like hedge funds) that seek aggressive value 
extraction and short-term gains, whilst encouraging those (like pension funds) that may 
look for more stable and long-term investments in emerging sectors of the economy. 
 
 Voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives are insufficient in addressing the 
foundational shifts needed to meet the challenge of climate change, hence the need for 
regulatory pathways to achieve corporate sustainability and build a more resilient 
economy. 
 
 Directors’ incentives need to be reformulated. Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 
should be amended to specify that the primary duty of a director is the long-term success 
of a company (to the benefit of all stakeholders, including employees), rather than merely 
the maximization of the shareholder interest (through dividends and share buybacks).  
 
 There needs to be more democracy and transparency in executive pay, involving 
increased disclosure of pay ratios and broader stakeholder governance of compensation. 
 
 There is a strong case for company boards to be more diverse and inclusive, with action 
needed to achieve a wider and more accurate representation of women and BAME 
members.  
 
 There is also both a convincing moral and economic rationale for an enhanced employee 
voice within governance structures, as part of the democratization of work. In particular, 
company law should be reformed to require board-level employee representation. 
 
 Consideration should be given to promoting new corporate forms and governance 
structures which explicitly include positive social impact as a legally defined goal, and are 
accountable to stakeholders as well as shareholders (either through a new type of statutory 
corporation with model articles, or as a voluntary company with ‘B Corp’ certification). 
 
 A range of new enforcement mechanisms should be considered. Principal among these 
would be a new Business Commission to represent the interests of all stakeholders, with 
powers to intervene at the behest of shareholders, employees, or consumers. Other 
enforcement mechanisms might include new criminal liabilities for company mis-
management. 
 
 As codes of conduct and guidance statements from industry have proved ineffective, a 
coherent form of regulatory overlay will be required to facilitate this reform agenda, with 
progressive company law reform shifting the governance framework in a more pluralistic 
and stakeholder-oriented direction. 
 
As the bold type in these bullet points indicates, these are not detailed policy proposals, but rather a 
series of broad statements and challenges for discussion, from which policy can develop through 
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dialogue, and we stress the importance of moving in a planned and pragmatic way towards a new 
regulatory architecture for business. A progressive Labour government must work with business, 
not against it, improving business practices whist simultaneously promoting long-term economic 
growth. The aim will be to encourage productive, purposeful, and long-term oriented companies, 
founded on a partnership between government, shareholders, management, and workers. The 
potential benefits are widespread, and include: better management decision-making, increased 
employee engagement, improved corporate performance, long-term value creation, and more 
sustainable economic growth. The task for the Labour Party now is to provide the leadership and 
vision to take these arguments forward. 
 
We next offer a critique and comment on the current UK corporate governance regime, as a means 
to establish the rationale for this radical and progressive reform agenda. 
 
2. Financialization, corporate governance, and democracy 
  
Corporate governance essentially concerns the way power is exercised over corporate entities. In 
large private firms, the nature of firm ownership, and the roles of shareholders and directors, are 
crucial factors (Moore and Petrin, 2017; Tricker, 2015). In the UK, the corporate governance system 
is strongly oriented towards a norm of shareholder primacy, and towards the ‘maximization of 
shareholder value’ (MSV).  
 
There is now extensive evidence that this model, with its emphasis on using corporate profits for 
share buybacks and delivering returns to investors, has a systemic bias towards value extraction and 
transfer rather than value creation, and acts as a barrier to internal, long-term re-investment in 
human and physical capital, productive capacity, and R&D (CIPD, 2017; Lawrence, 2017; Lazonick, 
2016). Strongly embedded incentives for asset holders and corporate executives create powerful 
tendencies towards short-termism in both finance and industry (Gospel et al., 2014; Jacobs and 
Mazzucato, 2016). Relatedly, there has developed an active ‘market for corporate control’ in the 
UK, with the associated threat of hostile takeovers, which tends to induce asset disposals and job 
losses in the companies targeted (Johnston and Njoya, 2014; Pendleton, 2016). It is also clear that 
the MSV model generates and disseminates a language, concepts, and practices that increases its 
reach and impact beyond large listed corporations into other sectors, sizes, and types of 
organisation (Cushen and Thompson, 2016). 
 
Analysis of the EU28 shows a strong positive correlation between shareholder-oriented governance 
systems and poor performance on productivity, lower R&D expenditure, and higher rates of 
inequality (Lawrence, 2017; Stiglitz, 2016). Clearly this corporate model is broken, with short-term 
profit maximization leading to value extraction, asset stripping, insecurity, and inequality (Sikka et 
al., 2019). If we look deeper we can see how this approach to corporate governance, and the 
problems associated with it, have been facilitated by processes of financialization and 
marketization over recent decades. Simply put, financialization refers to the generation of income 
through financial channels rather than productive activities. Whilst profit-seeking activity increases 
wealth through the creation of value and associated economic growth, rent-seeking activity 
generates firm-level profits merely by changes to the structure and financing of the firm. As 
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economic rents are extracted from the production process, income is derived from ownership of 
existing assets, without creating anything new (Blakeley, 2019). 
 
Recent decades have seen the emergence of financialised corporations in the UK, centred on the 
growing embrace of these rent-seeking behaviours. Within this framework, investors will tend to 
see firms as ‘bundles of assets’ within a wider portfolio, and the stakeholder interests of employees 
become marginalised (Clark and Macey, 2015). Financialization thus breaks the ‘retain and re-invest’ 
circuit of capital associated with managerial capitalism, giving rise to a finance-dominated regime 
of accumulation. Corporate earnings are re-directed to shareholders in the form of increased 
dividends and share buybacks, rather than re-invested in the productive capacity of the firm or in 
rising real wages (Horn, 2017). These trends have also developed further, rather than receded, since 
the 2008 financial crisis. In 2018, overall total shareholder pay-outs among the 100 largest UK-
domiciled companies stood at just over 100% of net profits, compared with 43% in 2011. Comparing 
corporate behaviour in the first and second halves of the decade following the financial crisis reveals 
a measurable increase in total shareholder pay-outs relative to pre-tax profits (CommonWealth, 
2020). 
 
In terms of the impact on business and management, it is clear that financialization drives corporate 
level practices, and the pursuit of shareholder value in deregulated and globalising markets has 
intensified constraints on the strategic choices of firms (Thompson, 2003, 2013). There is a direct 
connection between the pursuit of shareholder value, the behaviour of firm management, and 
negative impacts on high-performance productivity bargains (Clark, 2009; Cushen and Thompson, 
2016). The key feature of these developments is that employers are unable to ‘keep their side of the 
bargain’ with employees, given the constraints imposed upon them by capital markets, the 
operation of which exacerbates a disunity, or ‘disconnect’, between macro-level structural changes 
and micro-level workplace outcomes (Dobbins and Dundon, 2017). It is difficult for firms to protect 
human capital investments based on ‘mutual gains’ and ‘partnership’, as these are fragile under 
threat of takeover (Davis et al., 2013; Deakin et al., 2002), and management attitudes towards 
implicit contracts with employees are informed by the imperative of returning money to investors 
(Appelbaum et al., 2013). The process of financialization also undermines the organisational 
capacity of trade unions (Grady and Simms, 2019), whilst the UK corporate governance regime 
lacks strong employee voice and representation mechanisms (Gold and Rees, forthcoming).  
 
It is crucial to recognise that these trends are not independent or ‘natural’ market mechanisms, and 
their outcomes and effects are not inevitable. Rather, they have been actively stimulated by 
successive governments, insofar as financialization depends upon marketization, in other words the 
creation of ‘regulatory preconditions’ for markets to arise and develop (Callaghan, 2015), thereby 
extending the market mechanism to new areas of social life. Key factors in this process of 
marketization have been the globalization and deregulation of financial markets, and the 
encouragement of an autonomous role for financial intermediaries and asset managers, which have 
in turn facilitated the fragmentation of corporate ownership (Clark, 2016). The removal of 
regulatory obstacles to international capital movements and foreign takeovers of British firms has 
been accompanied by a steep decline in the proportion of UK-based institutional investors and 
individual shareholders, with a corresponding increase in foreign investors (to over 50% of UK 
equities). Individual ownership has shrunk from around 50% in the 1960s to less than 10% today. UK 
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pension funds and insurance companies’ ownership of UK listed companies has also declined, from 
over 50% in 1990 to less than 15% today, whilst foreign institutions – such as hedge funds, 
sovereign wealth funds, and overseas pension funds – have taken an ever increasing share 
(Haldane, 2015).  
 
The combination of this increasing diversification of shareholdings, coupled with a marked reduction 
in length of shareholdings, has made shareholder control over management highly problematic 
(Haldane, 2016; ICSA, 2017; Kay, 2012). With the share registers of UK companies increasingly 
globalised, investors have limited jurisdictional commitments, and concentrate on direct and 
speedy financial gains (Johnston and Njoya, 2014). In 1992, when the UK Corporate Governance 
Code was introduced (the so-called ‘Cadbury Code’), over 50% of shares in UK firms were owned by 
UK-based pension funds and insurance companies, and these were the investors implicitly expected 
to make the principle of ‘comply or explain’ work. By 2014, however, that figure had fallen to less 
than 10% – ‘The majority of shares in UK listed companies are now held by institutions based 
outside the UK, which were not a significant presence in the market in 1992 … For many of them the 
UK market represents only a small percentage of their overall equity portfolio, and they face 
practical barriers to direct engagement with UK companies’ (ICSA, 2017: 7–8). 
 
As the priorities of ‘managerial capitalism’ have been progressively eclipsed in this way by those of 
‘financial capitalism’, new investor-owners have also emerged, such as hedge funds, private equity 
(PE) funds, and associated asset management (Mazzucato, 2018). As Clark and Macey (2015) 
explain, these new financial intermediaries typically seek to generate profits by alterations to the 
structure of a firm, taking substantial but minority ownership positions in listed firms on an activist 
basis, either with the aim of launching a hostile takeover or to encourage incumbent management 
to improve returns to investors via restructuring, divestment, or closure of under-performing units. 
Hedge funds will often use their cash resources to buy up distressed or bankrupt companies, 
promising to turn them around. In many cases this involves very substantial downsizing of the 
business and the disposal of whatever assets can be sold for cash. In some cases, a viable but much 
smaller business is created, which can eventually be sold on the market to another corporate group 
or in a management buyout (Hadden et al., 2014). As for private equity, the cases where PE firms 
provide the investment or management expertise to help turn companies around or grow are the 
exception, not the rule. The norm is for PE firms to make extensive use of debt and leverage to seek 
quick capital gains by financial engineering 0f the balance sheets of companies, forcing through 
cost-cutting measures which frequently entail job losses, greater precarity, cuts to pay, and poorer 
working conditions (Appelbaum et al., 2013). Capital markets thus increasingly regulate the 
behaviour of firms, driving down the labour share, and legitimizing more aggressive management 
of corporate assets through delayering, downsizing, and divestment (Pendleton and Gospel, 2014). 
 
Alongside liberalisation and deregulation in capital markets, the core institutions and guiding 
principles of UK corporate governance – takeover regulations, governance and stewardship codes, 
and directors’ fiduciary duties – are also strongly oriented towards a norm of shareholder primacy 
(Armour et al., 2003). As Deakin (2018) notes, these rules are justified as making it easier for 
shareholders to hold managers to account (as per agency theory), yet their effect is to tilt the 
balance of power away from workers and managers, and towards the holders of the capital interest. 
Over recent decades there has been a growing political acquiescence in, and support for, these 
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market-enabling rules. Public policy has also emphasised accountability to shareholders, rather 
than regulation, as the means to improve corporate practice (Talbot, 2013, 2020). We argue that the 
time is now right for a series of rigorous market-restraining counter-measures. Our analysis 
suggests a requirement for reform across several areas, with policy options relating to all of the key 
actors in corporate governance. This will necessitate the state providing a coherent form of 
regulatory overlay, with the aim of democratizing the way businesses are governed and the way 
decisions are made. Before outlining specific areas for policy development, the justification for 
reform will be further strengthened if we briefly reflect on the nature of – and distinction between – 
the corporation and the firm. 
 
The corporation is an entity with a separate legal personhood, distinct from its shareholders and its 
directors (Hockman, 2012; Kay, 2015). It is not a fixed or given institution, but rather is a social 
construction, constituted by politics and law. In legal terms, and contrary to widely held ‘common 
sense’, shareholders do not own corporations, or the assets of corporations. Shareholders only own 
shares of stock (bundles of intangible rights, most particularly the rights to receive dividends and to 
vote on limited issues). The corporate form grants shareholders an extraordinary privilege – limited 
liability – which shields them from liability for the actions the corporation takes on their behalf. This 
means shareholders have virtually no responsibility for corporate malpractices, and yet they still 
enjoy controlling rights (CommonWealth, 2020; Ireland, 1999; Robé, 2011). Indeed, economic 
coordination rights in the corporation are currently assigned exclusively to capital via property, and 
labour is effectively excluded from the government of the company. Moreover, whilst shareholders 
can hedge their risks by purchasing a diversified portfolio and, thanks to the liquidity of the market, 
divesting their stock relatively easily at any time, employees with firm-specific skills are unable to 
hedge, as they will be most unlikely to hold a portfolio of jobs, and they cannot simply trade one job 
for another (Brown et al., 2019). Workers bear long-term, firm-specific risks in companies, they have 
their livelihoods at stake, and they usually have a far longer relationship with the company than the 
typical shareholder (Sikka, 2008). Workers thus carry disproportionate risk in relation to company 
decision-making, and yet they have little chance to influence it (Deakin, 2018).  
 
Acknowledging this imbalance is at the heart of the argument for the democratization of the 
company (Ferreras, 2019; Fraser et al., 2020). Rather than assuming (wrongly) that shareholders 
own firms, and therefore permitting them sole entitlement to control and governance rights, it is 
more accurate to recognise that there are two classes of investors constituting the firm. One is 
capital. The other is labour. Their investments are mutually dependent: without one or the other, 
the firm would cease to function. However, the way firms are currently governed does not reflect 
this reality, since governance rights are only granted to one of these investors. As Ferreras (2017) 
explains in detail, whilst it is to be expected that the corporation (as a vehicle for investing capital) 
will be governed by people whose principle relationship to the firm (via that corporation) is an 
instrumental one, reflecting the dominant maxim in capital investment, of profit and return, what is 
not equitable (or inevitable) is that these capital investors alone should have also secured the 
political right to govern firms for themselves. This, in essence, is the case for widening democracy in 
corporate governance – ‘The time has come for firms to take labour investors seriously as key 
partners not only in the management but also the government of the firm’ (Ferreras, 2017: 61). In 
reality, the firm is not owned by shareholders. Rather, the firm is a ‘political entity’, much broader in 
scope than the corporation, and is more accurately considered as ‘an institution of the commons: a 
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social institution with multiple constituencies who share overlapping economic and political claims’ 
(CommonWealth, 2020: 13). As such, a firm’s government should represent all its constituents, not 
merely those legally organised via the corporation. All of a firm’s investors have the right to a voice 
in the governance structures that rule them.  
  
3. Shareholders and stewardship 
 
The above analysis would suggest an urgent need to reform and regulate the role of shareholders. 
There is a convincing argument that shareholders should only have entitlements commensurate 
with their commitment and legal responsibility, and that a stronger set of social obligations should 
come with the privilege of limited liability. Principal areas for discussion here would therefore be 
around downgrading shareholder entitlement, and challenging the discourse of so-called 
‘enlightened shareholder value’ (Talbot, 2013). That said, an argument can also be made that the 
powers and responsibilities of shareholders need to be increased – so that they can more effectively 
control the composition and remuneration of the board of directors, and encourage boards to 
consider ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) issues. This tension reflects the essentially 
double-edged nature of the capitalist economy, wherein shareholder activity can be both a driver of 
‘financialised’ corporations as well a factor in the emergence of more ‘socialised’ corporations 
(Ireland, 2018). Policy proposals in this area will therefore need to strike a careful balance. 
 
If we examine the regulatory response of governments since the 2008 financial crisis, rather than 
emphasising limits on shareholder rights, the idea that institutional shareholders can in fact act as 
effective monitors or ‘stewards’ of the company has been a defining feature of this period (Talbot, 
2020), as encapsulated in a new code (the 2010 Stewardship Code). Likewise, proposals for reform 
arising from the recent government review of corporate governance centre on further revisions to 
the Corporate Governance Code and the Stewardship Code (BEIS, 2017; Mor, 2019). These are both 
‘soft law’ initiatives, continuing recent principles of code-based reform, with a commitment to 
addressing perceived weaknesses in corporate governance through greater shareholder 
engagement (Deakin, 2014; Veldman and Willmott, 2016).  
 
However, whilst the Stewardship Code contains a principle that institutional investors should 
publicly disclose how they will discharge their stewardship responsibilities, ‘it cannot be assumed 
that the stewardship role is intended to protect anyone other than the particular beneficiaries of the 
fund for which those investors have responsibility’ (Hockman, 2014: 213). Unlike most members of a 
partnership or a family business, shareholders’ interest is comparatively detached and speculative, 
and they will seek to invest in whatever will produce a strong return. If they are not satisfied, the 
easiest option is to invest elsewhere. Moreover, we have noted that there has been a marked shift in 
ownership patterns in favour of foreign investors and hedge funds. As such, ‘the fact that the Code 
is directed towards UK-based asset managers and domestic institutional investors, who own less 
than one third of the shares in UK quoted companies, means that it is unlikely to have a 
transformative effect on corporate governance’ (Hockman, 2014: 214). We should also note that in 
order to be ‘good stewards’, shareholders would need to be both active in corporate governance 
and guided by social responsibility, but as Talbot (2013: 185) observes, ‘many … only seem active 
when engaged in social irresponsibility and rapaciousness; otherwise they are inactive. Broadly 
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speaking, pension funds fall into the latter (passive) category, and hedge funds into the former 
(active, rapacious) category’.  
 
This reminds us, then, of the need to distinguish between different types of share ownership and 
investment activity. As Meadway (2020) argues, whilst some financial activities and institutions 
(hedge funds, for example) are clearly very much driven by short-term gains, others (like pension 
funds) often look for longer-term, stable investments that produce steady returns, and these might 
be the sorts of investment – in renewable power generation, or new public transport, for example – 
that are urgently needed. Evidently there is a strong case for limiting, or in some instances 
completely removing, the right to vote of those whose connection to the company is short-term 
and opportunistic – hedge funds do not operate out of a concern to improve corporate governance, 
but rather to make short-term gains for the fund – but at the same time, reform proposals must 
recognise the growth and potential in responsible and long-term shareholder investment. 
 
Various policy options are available that might distinguish between different types of investor. 
Consideration could be given to imposing a minimum period between the acquisition and disposal 
of shares. Voting rights in relation to takeovers could be made conditional upon a minimum 
ownership period, say two years, something the Trades Union Congress has long argued for (TUC, 
2014), and voting rights per share could increase with length of ownership. Similarly, takeover 
decisions could be restricted to shareholders who own shares when the bid is launched, 
distinguishing between those with a long-term commitment and those without, and rewarding the 
former with differentiated control of the company. Alternatively, a two-tier share register might be 
developed, with long-term investors again monopolising voting rights. Revisions to the Stewardship 
Code could also be considered. For example, funds which engage in ‘M&A arbitrage’ could be 
required to make reference in their Code statements to how, if at all, they engage with the 
management of companies, what the nature of their interest is (i.e. shares or derivatives, long/short 
combinations etc.), the typical duration of their interest, etc. Indeed, all investors and asset 
managers should be required to be public about their stewardship and engagement activity 
(Powdrill, 2018).  
 
There is now an emerging consensus among many investors around the need to move past the sole 
objective of maximizing firm profits, and recently there has been a more intense focus on ESG 
criteria in the management of companies. Investment in ESG strategies has grown rapidly, with the 
Global Impact Investing Network estimating the value of dedicated impact funds at more than 
$500bn in 2019 (Colback, 2020). Again there is a need for a balanced policy response. Although so-
called mainstream investors do pay attention to ethical and other factors that may affect the 
reputation or performance of the companies in which they invest, importantly, this focus is not their 
principal concern. It is a beneficial side-effect of their desire to achieve a good return for their 
clients, not an attempt to fulfil some sort of implicit public duty (Powdrill, 2018). So, whilst the rapid 
development of ‘sustainable asset management’ is unquestionably very positive, the ambitious 
sales pitch on these themes raises questions as to how to inform investors properly and, more 
particularly, how to prevent the risk of ‘greenwashing’. 
 
It has been suggested that, post Covid-19, companies may adopt a more ‘authentic’ version of social 
responsibility, and we could see a new wave of investors demanding investment strategies that go 
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beyond ESG risk integration in pursuit of real-world social and environmental impact. For this to 
happen, it is said that business leaders and institutional investors will need to ‘embrace a new era of 
governance dialogue’ (ICGN, 2020). Again, however, many companies have been criticised for 
continuing ‘business as usual’ or, worse, taking advantage of the current crisis. We should also note 
that the much publicised Business Roundtable declaration in the US will not easily change business 
behaviour. Individual CEOs may sincerely wish to make progress, but the declaration is perhaps best 
seen as an example of the age-old ‘don’t regulate us and we will be nice’ argument. We would argue 
that in this area corporate voluntarism is insufficient, and given the nature of the UK corporate 
governance regime, as outlined above, regulation will be required to ensure companies pursue a 
long-term approach to sustainable value creation (Sjåfjell, 2018).  
 
The pervasive and well-entrenched discourse of ‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR) has 
consistently advanced a purely voluntary concept of business responsibility, claiming that firms’ 
social objectives can simply be ‘integrated’ into business decision-making, the so-called win-win, 
‘business case’ scenario, often referred to as a process of ‘creating shared value’ (Porter and Kramer, 
2011). There are various self-regulatory mechanisms and controls which corporate management 
might initiate to ensure, or be seen to ensure, compliance with ethical standards. But there remains 
a fundamental ambiguity in CSR’s role and intent (Hadden et al., 2014). It may be a means to 
legitimise and promote genuine modifications in corporate behaviour, but it may also function 
merely as a form of public relations window-dressing. The problem is that voluntarist CSR ignores 
the inherent tensions between the legal framing of management discretion under shareholder 
primacy and social pressures to address wider concerns which may not – and indeed are unlikely to 
– be embraced by shareholders (Johnston, 2017). Indeed, this failure to acknowledge the tension in 
firms between economic and social value-creation is a characteristic of much of the stakeholder 
value and CSR field (Crane et al., 2014).  
 
So, as Johnston (2017) explains, under the current corporate governance regime we cannot assume 
that shareholders will steer or ‘steward’ companies towards a long-term and socially responsible 
approach, and indeed there is evidence that shareholder engagement is actually having the 
opposite effect, with on-going pressure on managers to maximize quarterly returns further 
reducing the willingness of firms to voluntarily address the social costs (the externalities) their 
activities create. The ‘business case’ argument for CSR – voluntary practices exercised under the 
purview of corporate discretion – is also a weak form of sustainability that is insufficient in 
addressing the foundational changes needed to meet the United Nations Sustainable Development 
Goals and climate targets by 2030 (Sjåfjell, 2018). Hence the increasing recognition of the need for 
regulatory pathways to achieving corporate sustainability (Cullen et al., 2020; Vitols and Kluge, 
2011). Assessing the picture across Europe, Johnston and Sjåfjell (2019) argue that information 
disclosure alone is insufficient to secure the contribution of business to environmental 
sustainability, in the face of the ‘detrimental social norm’ of shareholder primacy, and therefore a 
fundamental shift towards a firmer and more coherent regulatory approach is needed. In this 
context the task for governments is to ‘dare to mandate that one of the objects of business is to 
contribute to sustainability, that it must be verified whether and the extent to which this is done, 
and create a meaningful threat of enforcement in the event of non-compliance’ (ibid: 15). 
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This analysis suggests that, rather than focus on voluntary, management-led CSR, it is more helpful 
to acknowledge ‘the more deeply rooted institutional foundations of corporate irresponsibility’, in 
other words how ‘the potential for irresponsibility … is inscribed in the corporate legal form as 
currently constituted’ (Ireland, 2018: 13). As Ireland (2018) explains, in the context of a corporate 
legal form which combines no-liability shareholding with increasingly open and global financial 
markets, we should not be surprised to see the emergence of socially irresponsible forms of 
governance. As such, appeals to voluntarist CSR, or to pursue shareholder value in a more 
‘enlightened’ manner, rather miss the point: ‘in this institutional context, reforms aimed at 
empowering and enhancing the proprietorial rights of rentier shareholders and at making them 
more active, whether in financial markets or in corporations, are … more likely to exacerbate the 
problem than to solve it’ (ibid: 34). As such, ideas like time-dependant voting rights are a step in the 
right direction, but they do not go far enough, as the problem is not merely one of shareholder 
‘commitment’. Rather, as long as no-liability rentier shareholding continues to be combined with 
control rights, this will be a recipe for short-termist governance, managerial excess, and corporate 
irresponsibility. A more rigorous solution lies in acknowledging separate corporate personhood, 
dispelling the ideological myth of ‘shareholder ownership’, and institutionalising a stronger role in 
governance for labour and other stakeholders (ibid: 34–35). A range of reforms can further this 
agenda and set in train the next stage of development of the corporate legal form. 
  
4. Directors and the boardroom 
 
As we have outlined, shareholder-driven models of corporate governance are heavily predicated on 
the need to discipline firm leadership, with company directors (the agent) acting in ways that are 
consistent with the interests of shareholders (the principal). Hence corporate executives see their 
main duty as maximising short-term shareholder value, which steers them away from internal firm 
investment and value-creating activities (Brown et al., 2019; Cushen and Thompson, 2016). 
Although in law directors are not simply the ‘agents’ of shareholders, duty bound to maximise 
shareholder wealth to the exclusion of other interests (Kay, 2015), directors’ skills have nonetheless 
been honed to increase share prices and dividends in ever more financialised ways, and they will 
take professional pride in doing so because these are valued achievements which are rewarded in 
remuneration and promotion (Talbot, 2013). Indeed, modern forms of executive remuneration 
which align the interests of managers and shareholders have made the ruthless pursuit of 
shareholder value very lucrative for executives, and since the 1990s their pay has seen exponential 
growth (Ireland, 2018). We thus need to consider a range of reforms to the incentives, 
compensation, and composition of the board of directors. 
 
Principal among these reforms is the need to revise the duties of directors, as specified in the 
Companies Act 2006. Specifically, this would mean re-wording Section 172 to make it explicit that 
the long-term success of a company is (or should be) the primary concern of its directors, and that 
shareholders’ interests, which are increasingly short-term, do not eclipse those of employees as the 
principal long-term stakeholder in the firm. Recent government proposals in this area have now 
been incorporated into the revised Corporate Governance Code (effective from January 2019), with 
a new requirement on firms to ‘explain compliance’ with Section 172, and to disclose how boards 
‘have regard to’ non-shareholder interests. This disclosure involves explaining how key stakeholders 
have been identified, how their views have been sought, why the company’s engagement 
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mechanisms were considered appropriate, and how the information obtained from them influenced 
the board’s decision-making. Whilst this is a welcome development, in order to firmly shift 
corporate governance from its focus on shareholder value and towards a stakeholder model of 
purposeful enterprise, we would suggest a stronger formulation is needed.  
 
Currently, Section 172 states: ‘A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good 
faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as 
a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to: (a) the likely consequences of any 
decision in the long term, (b) the interests of the company’s employees, (c) the need to foster the 
company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers and others, (d) the impact of the 
company’s operations on the community and the environment, (e) the desirability of the company 
maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct, and (f) the need to act fairly as 
between members of the company’. This could be re-worded to more strongly assert the long-term 
success of the company as its central objective (‘long-term success’ is used in the first paragraph of 
the Corporate Governance Code but is absent in the legislation). Moreover, the words ‘for the 
benefit of its members as a whole’ could be removed, as these suggest the primacy of shareholders 
over all other interests. Instead of stating that directors must ‘have regard to’, there could be a clear 
duty to take account of the interests of a range of stakeholders: employees, pension holders, 
suppliers, customers, creditors, the environment, the local community, and society as a whole. 
Again, the firm needs to be understood – and so formally regulated – as a social and political entity 
constituted by a wide range of investors, and not merely as a vehicle for the interests of capital. 
 
This brings us to a further issue that has contributed significantly to the erosion of public trust in 
business, namely the widening pay gap between the average worker and senior executives, and the 
extensive use of long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) and stock options, which gradually reward 
executives through equity in the company. In the UK, the ratio of executive to average worker pay 
increased from 47 times in 1998 to a staggering 148 times in 2014 (High Pay Centre, 2015). Pay 
levels have risen far in excess of returns to shareholders, profits, and employee wages (Big 
Innovation Centre, 2017; Lazonick, 2016). As of the latest filings, just over 700 executives at 86 of 
the 100 largest non-financial UK companies held a collective £6 billion in equity at their respective 
corporations, representing nearly £8.5 million per director (CommonWealth, 2020).  
 
The recent government proposals in this area primarily relate to company responses to significant 
shareholder opposition to their executive pay, pay ratio reporting, remuneration committee 
responsibilities, and clearer disclosure with respect to the share-based incentive components of 
remuneration policies. Again a number of these proposals are now reflected in the newly-revised 
Corporate Governance Code (CIPD / High Pay Centre, 2019). For instance, from 2020, UK 
companies are required to list the pay ratios between their CEO and the 75th (upper quartile), 
median, and 25th percentile (lower quartile) points of the pay distribution of their UK employees 
(on a full-time equivalent basis). Other potential areas for further reform might include: mandatory 
employee and consumer votes on executive pay packages and bonuses (with bonuses only paid for 
extraordinary performance or effort, not as a matter of routine), a set ratio to be applied to the 
difference between CEO and average pay, a broader stakeholder governance of compensation 
(with boards having the final say), and effective measures to tackle the gender pay gap. Pay 
systems which are perceived to be fair are an important factor in good employment relations 
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(Stern, 2018), and workplace collective disputes frequently involve concern over the relative level of 
executive pay compared to that in the rest of an organisation (ACAS, 2018).  
 
In terms of the latest developments, a recent High Pay Centre (2020) report analyses the pay ratio 
disclosures made by 107 FTSE 350 companies between 1st January and 31st April 2020. It found that 
the median gap between the CEO and the lower quartile threshold of the pay distribution was 78:1 
for all companies in the sample, whilst for the larger FTSE 100 companies it was 109:1. As the report 
makes clear, hypothetical exercises reveal the potential for relatively minor redistributions from 
upper to lower quartile earners to achieve meaningful pay increases for the latter. For example, 
across all companies, reducing the pay of employees at the upper quartile by 3% could fund a 
median pay rise of £2,000 for the lowest earning quartile of employees in the same companies, 
whilst still leaving the median upper quartile earner with pay of over £60,000. Redistributions from 
those at the very top could achieve significantly more. Reflecting on the report, the Director of the 
High Pay Centre concluded: ‘After over a decade of pay stagnation, raising wages for low and 
middle-income workers is a vital political priority … Measures that can turn the hypothetical 
redistributions identified in our research into reality are integral to hopes that we can ‘build back 
better’ in the aftermath of the pandemic. Specific policies could include better workplace access for 
trade unions; business governance reforms to give workers more say in corporate decision making; 
and much wider provision of all-employee share ownership or profit-sharing schemes’ (Hildyard, 
2020).  
 
As well as reforms to the incentives and compensation of directors, there are also strong moral as 
well as economic reasons for broadening the composition of boards, and for seeking greater 
gender, ethnic, and social diversity. Improving the diversity of boardrooms so that their 
composition better reflects the demographics of employees, customers, and the communities 
within which companies operate can help improve decision-making and therefore performance, as 
well as ensure that boards have access to a wider range of perspectives, talent, and experience. 
There has been a steady increase in the number of women on the boards of the UK’s top companies 
in recent years. The final report of the Davies Review in 2015 showed that the proportion of female 
directors in FTSE 100 companies had more than doubled in the previous four years (BEIS, 2015), 
albeit from a low base, and progress has continued since. In 2017 there were only six all-male boards 
across the FTSE 350, down from 152 in 2011. That said, the more recent Hampton-Alexander 
Review has highlighted a lack of female representation in senior leadership roles on executive 
committees, which are one level below the board, and this has long been considered one of the 
main barriers to increasing gender balance in the boardroom, as they are seen as providing the 
pipeline of future directors (Goodley, 2020).  
 
For the government, the steady progress in this area is proof that a non-interventionist and 
business-led strategy, rather than legislative quotas and penalties, is the right approach (BEIS, 
2017). This view is also reflected in mainstream business circles. For example, the CIPD has always 
advocated a voluntary approach to increasing boardroom diversity, encouraging companies to 
develop their own responses to the challenge. There is extensive evidence that certain 
organisational practices are the most effective in promoting gender diversity in senior roles 
(principally an open and supportive culture, unbiased recruitment and selection practices, work–life 
balance policies that support female staff with caring responsibilities, and clear career paths and 
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promotional opportunities in middle and senior management roles). A CIPD (2015) report on gender 
diversity concludes that female progression to top roles is effectively only possible if companies 
‘provide a strong and sustainable framework to recruit and develop women at every stage of their 
career’ (ibid: 2). 
 
The implication of this position is that legislating to require that a certain number of women are 
appointed to board positions will not alter or remove the underlying reasons for a lack of 
boardroom diversity, and indeed a quota imposition could be counter-productive as it presents an 
appearance of equality (equality of outcome) without addressing the structural and organisational 
factors that continue to deny women equality of opportunity. As the CIPD (2015) conclude, it could 
also lead to a potential backlash towards those appointed as a result of perceived positive 
discrimination: ‘People want to be seen as successful based on their own ability and not as a result 
of their identity. While voluntary targets … can be helpful … the key criterion for boardroom 
appointments should be merit’ (CIPD, 2015: 4). The newly revised Corporate Governance Code very 
much reflects this sentiment, with Principle J stating: ‘Appointments to the board should be subject 
to a formal, rigorous and transparent procedure, and an effective succession plan should be 
maintained for board and senior management. Both appointments and succession plans should be 
based on merit and objective criteria and, within this context, should promote diversity of gender, 
social and ethnic backgrounds, cognitive and personal strengths’ (FRC, 2018: 8). 
 
Whilst improvements are being made to the gender balance in boardrooms, we feel that progress is 
too slow, and a legislative quota would indeed accelerate the pace of change. As a comparator, 
women-only shortlists in the selection of parliamentary candidates have of course helped to 
increase overall diversity in the Parliamentary Labour Party, and a quota for boardrooms would 
have the same effect. Clearly, if government is to play a constructive role in the current context, it 
must also seek to encourage and incentivise businesses, across all sectors and sizes, to provide a 
supportive framework of effective workplace and human resource policies, in order to promote and 
facilitate genuine equality of opportunity. At the same time there is a need to push for more 
ambitious targets for companies to meet with respect to new appointments to senior and executive 
management positions, and for more stringent and transparent reporting of diversity issues in 
annual reports. Reporting requirements have now been introduced through the Companies Act 
2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 2013, and these could be further 
monitored and strengthened so that shareholders and other stakeholders, including trade unions, 
have the necessary information to properly hold companies to account.  
 
Whilst there are welcome signs of progress in terms of gender diversity in the boardroom, the 
situation regarding ethnic diversity is less positive. The Parker Review published draft 
recommendations in November 2016 proposing a target for the FTSE 100 to appoint at least one 
board-level director from a Black and Minority Ethnic (BAME) background by 2021. A follow-up 
review in 2019 found just 84 directors from BAME backgrounds out of 1,048 director positions. That 
said, Sir John Parker believes there is now much broader support for boardroom diversity than when 
he launched the review, and that the recent strengthening of the Black Lives Matter movement will 
help to drive the issue forward (Makortoff, 2020). Together with the Covid-19 pandemic, this has 
undoubtedly increased public sensitivity to social injustice, and a number of companies have 
responded to this change in mood, with a range of business leaders making statements in solidarity 
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and vowing to examine their diversity practices (Colback, 2020). Major business groups like the BCC 
and the CBI are formulating plans in the wake of these developments. The CBI is pledging to 
establish a ‘business-led movement’ to boost boardroom diversity, and develop toolkits to help 
businesses attract, hire, and promote employees from BAME backgrounds. The TUC is stressing the 
need for employers to monitor recruitment, pay, and progression for BAME workers, and to publish 
clear targets for improving representation at all levels. Again there is a role for government 
intervention, and we believe that the Parker Review recommendation for at least one BAME board 
member in every FTSE 100 company should be legislated for. 
 
Notwithstanding greater gender and ethnic diversity, there remains a prevailing one-dimensionality 
in the constitution of most boards, with minimal, if any, representation from stakeholders other 
than investors and executives, and this is clearly a block on progressive corporate governance 
reform. Boardrooms remain relatively homogenous, and critics suggest they have in general 
become less open to innovation and more risk-averse, focusing on the short-term benefits of cost 
cutting rather than the long-term returns of investment (Lawrence, 2017). If corporate diversity 
policies focus only on the appointment of more female and BAME non-executive directors (NEDs), 
the prioritisation of shareholder value is likely to persist if these individuals continue to be drawn 
from the same business elite of executives and advisors, and very rarely from other constituencies. 
Moreover, robust oversight by NEDs has already proved elusive, and nomination processes remain 
relatively closed. In this context, corporate diversity policies may have little impact on shifting 
governance priorities and challenging short-termist ‘group think’ if directors all come from similar 
backgrounds and share the same bonds of class and educational privilege. In many large 
professional firms, there is a pressing need to facilitate the representation of different socio-
economic backgrounds and challenge the persistence of exclusionary mechanisms based on class 
(Ashley and Empson, 2017). The traditional boardroom monoculture needs to be challenged by 
dissenting voices and a ‘diversity of thought’, in order to promote more democratic governance and 
decision-making (Hadden et al., 2014). We expand on these arguments in the next section with 
reference to worker directors. 
 
5. Employees  
 
As we have outlined, there is extensive evidence that the UK corporate governance regime is tilted 
too far towards the interests of capital, and away from the interests of employees. Compared to 
shareholders, workers carry disproportionate risk in relation to company decision-making, yet have 
little chance to influence it. Shareholders can vote on who sits on the board and make other 
strategic decisions, and directors have a duty to promote their interests. However, unlike in other 
European countries, most UK employees have almost no formal rights to information or 
involvement in corporate decision-making, and are excluded from representation on company 
boards (TUC, 2016). In terms of formal employee participation rights, the UK ranks sixth from 
bottom among EU countries – ahead of only Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. We 
have also noted the potentially negative impact of the UK corporate governance regime on the 
development of collaborative or ‘partnership’ employment relations and ‘mutual gains’ between 
management and workers (Johnstone, 2015), raising the question of how far it is possible for 
enlightened employers to ‘keep their side of the bargain’ under the dominance of shareholder value 
in capital markets (Thompson, 2003, 2013).  
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Hence there is a strong case for progressive reform around employee consultation and voice within 
governance structures, and the benefits of this are widely recognised (Hall and Purcell, 2012; IPA / 
Tomorrow’s Company, 2012). There is evidence that board-level employee representation (BLER) 
can increase trust and co-ownership, enhance board insight by bringing a different perspective and 
information set to the board, encourage employees to feel more empowered and engaged, foster 
longer-term management horizons, and improve the quality of decisions (Gold, 2011; Waddington 
and Conchon, 2016). Workers bring to the board an in-depth knowledge of the company they work 
for and the environment in which it operates, making them well-placed to contribute to strategic 
and operational decisions. Board-level employee representatives are also able to disrupt ‘group 
think’, for example of the sort that led to the excessive dividend payments at Carillion. Employee 
representatives could have questioned this and focused minds on the long-term interests of the 
firm and on protecting the pension fund. 
 
There is now widespread political support for worker directors in the UK, with all the major political 
parties having made manifesto commitments in different forms (Labour went the furthest in 2019, 
arguing that workers in large firms should have a third of board seats). Support for the principle of 
worker directors is also increasingly mainstream. Andy Haldane, Chief Economist at the Bank of 
England, has suggested that company law gives too much weight to the interests of shareholders, 
and that putting workers on boards and making directors consider the ‘interests of all stakeholders’ 
could be economically beneficial. The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales has 
concluded that employee directors support long-term thinking, help stakeholder engagement, 
improve board behaviour, and enhance board credibility (ICAEW, 2018). In the final report of its 
Commission on Economic Justice, the IPPR (2018) proposes that large companies of more than 250 
employees should have at least two workers, elected by the workforce, on both their main board 
and the remuneration committee, as something likely to enhance the quality of strategic decision-
making, increase the diversity of opinion and experience on the board, represent employees’ 
interests, and strengthen employee engagement. The TUC has long argued for BLER, and advances 
a series of core principles: companies should have a minimum of two worker directors on their 
board to avoid worker directors being a ‘lone voice’; worker directors should be elected by the 
workforce, with candidates nominated by unions where they are present (a worker director 
appointed by the board or by management is a contradiction in terms); worker directors should be 
given training and paid for the time needed to undertake their role; importantly, worker directors 
would bring a workforce perspective to the boardroom (as distinct from directly representing the 
interests of the workforce – which remains the role of trade unions through collective bargaining) 
(TUC, 2018; Williamson, 2018). Finally, recent polling by YouGov also suggests that the principle of 
workers on boards is supported by about two-thirds of the population in the UK. 
  
The case for worker directors is not only one of natural justice and democracy but also reflects a 
strong economic rationale (Tomorrow’s Company, 2016). The interests of workers are well-
correlated with long-term company success, and countries with strong worker participation rights 
and practices (on board representation, workplace representation, and collective bargaining) score 
more highly than other countries over a range of important measures – including R&D expenditure, 
employment rates, and educational participation among young people – as well as having lower 
rates of poverty and inequality (Williamson, 2018). In much of Continental Europe – including many 
of the most successful economies such as Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Denmark – 
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workers have the right to be represented on company boards. In 14 of these countries, these rights 
are extensive, in that they apply to the majority of private companies. Significantly, they apply in 
countries like Sweden that have a unitary board system (i.e. a single board of directors) as in the UK, 
as well as in countries like Germany that have a two-tier board system (i.e. with an executive 
management board and a supervisory board which is almost entirely non-executive). In broad 
terms, worker directors form a significant foundation of ‘industrial citizenship’ across Europe (TUC, 
2016). 
 
The last major debate about worker directors in the UK was in 1977, when the Committee of Inquiry 
on Industrial Democracy (the Bullock Committee) proposed measures for worker directors in all UK-
based companies. The Labour government published a White Paper in 1978 which proposed that 
companies should negotiate the details of BLER themselves with unions, but that statutory fall-
back arrangements should apply in cases of failure to agree. The Conservative government elected 
in 1979 abolished existing worker director schemes (at British Steel and the Post Office), and there 
was no further progress in the area for a generation (Gold and Waddington, 2019). Subsequent 
experience with BLER in the UK has been meagre, with First Group for many years the only UK PLC 
with a worker director (since 1989). However, after some forty years, BLER has now re-emerged as 
a significant issue on the UK political agenda. And it has re-emerged from a perhaps unlikely source. 
Launching her campaign for the Conservative Party leadership in 2016, Theresa May said: ‘In 
practice [non-executive directors] are drawn from the same, narrow social and professional circles 
as the executive team and – as we have seen time and time again – the scrutiny they provide is just 
not good enough. So if I’m prime minister, we’re going to change that system, and we’re going to 
have not just consumers represented on company boards, but employees as well’. Alas, upon taking 
office, the reality did not match this lofty ambition. Following a Green Paper consultation and 
Select Committee enquiry, in August 2017 the government invited the Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC) to revise the Corporate Governance Code to include a new requirement for companies to 
adopt, on the Code’s ‘comply or explain’ basis, one of three mechanisms for strengthening 
employee voice in the boardroom: (i) a designated existing non-executive director, (ii) a formal 
employee advisory council, or (iii) a director from the workforce (BEIS, 2017).  
 
In advance of these new proposals coming into effect in January 2019, ICSA published a poll in 
October 2018 indicating that the large majority of companies were opposed to the idea of worker 
directors – 70% felt that having workers on their board would not be a good idea, 13% thought that 
it would be a good idea, and 16% were unsure. Of those who had decided on a position, the largest 
proportion favoured the designated NED option. In response, Peter Swabey (ICSA Policy and 
Research Director) commented: ‘While there is an overall feeling that it is crucial that the board 
hears and takes note of the views of staff and other stakeholders, respondents believe that there 
are mechanisms other than a seat at the board table that will allow them to do so …. Some 
companies have a large number of employees across multiple sites and a diverse workforce in terms 
of skill base and level of technical or professional expertise – and they might have different needs, 
interests, and priorities’. A Local Authority Pension Fund Forum (LAPFF, 2019) report confirmed this 
picture, based on a survey of around 20% of the FTSE 100 and 10% of the FTSE 350. Of those that 
had decided how to comply with the revised Code requirements, 73% said they would appoint a 
designated NED, 27% had opted to convene a workforce advisory panel, and only 5% said they 
would appoint a director from the workforce. The most common reason given for rejecting a worker 
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director was the size of the workforce – some companies said their workforces were too small, 
whilst larger companies questioned how one person could represent a global workforce. Other 
objections included the potential for conflicts of interest, distraction, and delayed decision-making.  
 
There has been a widespread critique of corporate responses to the revised Code, with the sense 
that companies are being too cautious and resisting change. The NED route is seen as the weaker 
option, and some critics have suggested that, far from embedding effective worker voice at board 
level, this can amount to little more than a PR exercise. NEDs are part-time, tend to hold multiple 
appointments, and may spend only one or two days a month on corporate matters. They are not 
elected by employees and do not receive any mandate from employees (Rees, 2019). Responding to 
the LAPFF survey, the acting chair Cllr Paul Doughty said: ‘Companies are overwhelmingly taking 
the safe option of giving responsibility to a non-executive director ... [which] shows a disappointing 
lack of innovation and imagination’. Some press commentary has also been scathing. The 
Independent commented that Theresa May’s ‘world leading package of corporate reforms’ had 
failed employees and resulted only in ‘world leading excuse making’ on the part of Britain’s biggest 
companies. Similarly, The Guardian concluded that ‘Theresa May’s idea was squashed in stages by 
the corporate lobby, to be replaced by a limp government proposal to give one existing non-
executive director the additional role of looking out for workers’ interests. The revised formulation 
is so loose as to be meaningless’ (Pratley, 2018). One year on, the FRC is also disappointed with 
corporate responses to the new options, stating in its annual review of the Code that ‘it is not clear 
from this year’s reporting how much thought was given to the effectiveness of the method chosen. 
There was little analysis of whether the likely method for engagement was the best one for the 
company to ensure that boards were made aware of key issues raised by the workforce. It was also 
unclear whether the board were able to feed back their views and decisions once made’ (FRC, 2020: 
11).  
 
There is some evidence of more progressive thinking in response to the revised Code, with a 
number of firms appointing worker directors – including Capita, Mears Group, and TUI. Capita 
appointed two employee directors – Lyndsay Browne (a chartered accountant) and Joseph Murphy 
(a civil engineer) – following an extensive recruitment process. Capita is therefore the first UK PLC 
to have multiple employee representatives on its main board, and they will act as full, independent 
directors. However, the overall picture is again of a voluntarist and code-based system delivering a 
further round of relatively weak and ineffective proposals, which can all too easily be evaded via the 
‘comply or explain’ principle. We would therefore suggest the need for legislation to mandate 
board-level employee representation, in order to properly embed worker voice in governance 
structures across British industry.  
 
Alongside the arguments for greater employee voice in governance structures, there is also a  
strong case for workers to share more fully in company profits, rather than these being delivered 
mainly to shareholders through dividends. Evidence suggests that companies with a greater level of 
worker ownership take a more long-term view of the company’s future. It is also morally right that 
workers share in the ownership of the workplace whose prosperity they help to create, and in which 
they spend so many of their waking hours (NEF, 2020). Various reforms are possible.  
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At one end of the spectrum are the traditional share options granted by the company, based on a 
variety of performance targets. However, many recipients of employee share schemes sell their 
shareholdings as soon as they can, and the schemes tend to be limited to those with greater 
disposable income (usually directors and senior staff), and so compound income inequality with 
equity inequality (Hadden et al., 2014). Some of these schemes have also been rightly criticized for 
providing excessive rewards and encouraging short-termism. For example, the share option scheme 
at house builders Persimmon provided over £100m to the Chief Executive and £500m in total to 
senior executives, and company profits were inflated as a result of the government Help to Buy 
subsidy scheme for first-time home owners, meaning the taxpayer was indirectly contributing to 
these extraordinary pay-outs (Evans, 2019). That said, in many cases vesting procedures will ensure 
that share owners cannot sell their shares before a certain period of time, which curtails this sort of 
opportunistic behaviour (Sengupta et al., 2007), and there is also evidence that employee share 
ownership lowers employee turnover rates and enhances labour productivity (Sengupta and Yoon, 
2018). At the other end of the spectrum are companies like the John Lewis Partnership, which 
operates as a trust under which profits, after sensible investment, are shared out proportionally 
among all staff, known as its partners. It has an impressive record in both commercial and human 
terms. Surpluses are distributed as an annual bonus (normally around 15% of salary) to the partners, 
in addition to gold-plated pensions and other benefits. In between these positions are various 
voluntary share option schemes offering workers shares in their companies, or in the case of 
Employee Ownership Trusts the opportunity to acquire the company as a whole. This latter process, 
providing benefits to the selling owner and to the acquiring workforce, was established in 2014, and 
dozens of companies (including, for example, Richer Sounds) have been sold to the workforce since 
then. Evidence suggests that employee-owned businesses are likely to deliver greater employment 
growth as well as increased productivity, and are also more resilient during economic downturns.  
 
Although evidence suggests that companies with greater levels of worker ownership are both more 
stable and more willing to tolerate long payback horizons on investment, this may only apply to a 
relatively small number of firms. Hence the need also for measures that apply to large listed firms. 
The 2019 Labour Party manifesto advanced a ‘middle way’ to bring about profit sharing, proposing 
that 10% of the shares of a large company should be transferred to an Inclusive Ownership Fund 
(IOF), for the benefit of the workers. Employees would receive an annual dividend from the trust 
(similar to the bonus usually received annually by John Lewis workers). What constitutes a ‘large 
company’ for this purpose is a subject for discussion, but perhaps a company with a turnover over 
£50m per annum or a workforce of 500 people. We believe this proposition should apply to large 
private companies as well as public limited companies. The trustees should be chosen by the 
workforce, with one trustee entitled to a seat on the board of directors. The shares owned by the 
trust would be new shares issued annually, and we suggest 2% per annum, so that a 10% maximum 
is reached over the lifetime of a parliament. A payment of £500 per annum per employee, indexed 
for inflation to the RPI, could be the limit, with any surplus paid to the Treasury for use as a ‘social 
dividend’, i.e. higher government spending that benefits business and society. Although not 
implemented, the floating of the Inclusive Ownership Fund idea by Labour has been an important 
straw in the wind, and whilst a number of technical arguments have been put forward against it, the 
principle that employees should have a stronger ownership stake in businesses is increasingly 
accepted. Some version of this policy is likely to remain politically attractive, and so is worthy of 
further development. 
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6. Ownership and governance structures 
 
As the discussion above indicates, employees sharing in company profits has implications for the 
ownership structure of businesses, and so we now consider the corporate governance aspects of 
alternative corporate forms in more detail. We have stressed that the current institutional 
configuration reflects a series of historical and contemporary choices, hence there is nothing 
inevitable about the dominance of the standard for-profit public corporation, indeed its continuing 
existence is conditional upon on-going political endorsement and public legitimacy. PLCs are 
without doubt powerful engines of growth and contribute to improved living standards, yet their 
hegemonic position does not mean that this form of ownership is necessarily the most beneficial 
method through which to provide economic and social well-being. As we have argued, corporations 
are in effect under little obligation to recognise or fulfil their stewardship or sustainability 
obligations, and indeed have every incentive to minimise them (Hadden et al., 2014; Talbot, 2020).  
 
There is a wide diversity of possible business ownership and governance structures. Interest in 
alternative forms (alternative, that is, to profit-driven and shareholder-governed) has been growing, 
which is hardly surprising given that the standard for-profit public corporation, as currently 
constituted, is so heavily implicated in the dysfunctionality of contemporary financialized 
capitalism. Alternative forms of business enterprise – such as social enterprises, mutuals, and 
cooperatives – suggest ways to develop a more sustainable ‘corporate landscape’ (Boeger and 
Villiers, 2018). Cooperatives are by nature organisations with a purpose, and are very often 
established to achieve a specific social or environmental goal. Cooperative ownership has the ability 
to increase employment stability and productivity levels, as well as making firms more democratic. 
However, the growth of cooperatives in the UK has been rather limited, due to an absence of 
legislation, institutional support, incentive, and promotion. A recent report from the New 
Economics Foundation recommends a cohesive programme of law and policy, including: improved 
access to finance, a re-worked government procurement policy, a ‘right to own’ for employees, a 
Cooperative Economy Act, and a new, statutory Cooperatives Development Agency (NEF, 2018).  
 
Although the encouragement of these more ‘socialised’ organisational forms is vitally important, it 
is nevertheless the case that a significant proportion of society’s productive resources remain under 
the direct or indirect control of large public corporations, whose activities dominate the economic 
landscape. Moreover, social enterprises may be considered overly restrictive for those looking to 
achieve a balance between social outcomes and delivering financial growth and returns. In other 
words, as Hunter (2018: 257) observes, ‘they have been regarded by some as being weighted too 
much to the social and not enough to the business or enterprise’. So, a central focus must again be 
on reform of the dominant corporate legal form, in order to encourage and incentivise companies to 
engage in more democratic and sustainable business practices.  
 
In part to address this, in December 2016 the government published its report of the Advisory Panel 
to the Mission-led Business Review (Cabinet Office, 2016). The review defined mission-led 
businesses as ‘profit-driven businesses that make a powerful commitment to social impact’. As 
Boerger and Hunter (2018) explain, such businesses are committed to making and distributing 
profits for their shareholders, to satisfy their need for capital investment, and it is this freedom to 
distribute profits that distinguishes them from ‘social enterprises’ in the wider UK policy context (as 
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social enterprises re-invest most of their profits back into their business for a social purpose). But at 
the same time as being commercially oriented, these businesses are also committed to social 
impact, and in this respect are categorically different from traditional corporate businesses that are 
run for shareholder value. So, being ‘mission-led’ signifies a shift from the supremacy of shareholder 
interest, and the quarterly measurement of how this is delivered in financial terms, to a more 
balanced assessment of the impact of a business’ activities across its stakeholders, assessed in the 
medium to long term.  
 
Boeger and Hunter (2018) consider whether the promotion of the mission-led business signals a 
genuine movement towards more responsible and sustainable business governance, or is simply a 
‘re-booting’ of the well-rehearsed business case for CSR (which, as we have noted above, is of 
limited value). They remain sceptical, as the focus on business with purpose as a ‘competitive 
advantage’ is reminiscent of the CSR agenda that has allowed corporations to present themselves 
as good corporate citizens whilst continuing to focus on shareholder interests to the detriment of 
other stakeholders. That said, the important factor here that distinguishes mission-led businesses is 
that they ‘have social impact or value hardwired into their constitution and governance model’ (ibid: 
8). In other words, such a business will explicitly embed a social and environmental mission into its 
governing document, and is then required to report performance against this on a regular basis (in 
contrast to CSR, which represents an entirely voluntary corporate policy). To that extent, the 
promotion of the mission-led business does ‘seem to be pointing to an appetite for more 
substantive change … [and] has the potential to have a positive societal impact at a scale beyond 
the reach of solely non-profit distributing organisations’ (ibid: 4 & 9). 
 
One example of a mission-led business is the B Corp. The B Corp movement is a global movement 
which aims to introduce new standards of social and environmental performance and use these to 
identify businesses which are using ‘business as a force for good’. There are now more than 2,500 
certified B Corps across more than 50 countries. Notable examples include Innocent Drinks (owned 
by Coca-Cola), Ben & Jerry’s (owned by Unilever), and dairy giant Danone. According to Hunter 
(2018), 109 UK companies had taken the opportunity to register as B Corps since this became 
possible in September 2015. Becoming a B Corp requires passing three elements of the B Corp 
‘test’, namely: (i) an impact assessment (which measures the overall impact of a company on its 
stakeholders); (ii) a legal test (it is a requirement for all B Corps to amend their constitutional 
documents to enshrine a commitment to the ‘triple bottom line’, principally through a new objects 
clause); and (iii) a declaration of interdependence (setting out a commitment to all stakeholders). 
Importantly, however, a B Corp is not a new legal form. Rather, it is a certification – an effort to 
provide an independent assurance that a business has met various criteria. Appropriate 
comparators are the certification schemes operated by the Fairtrade Foundation or the Forest 
Stewardship Council, which offer consumers a means of identifying products that meet a certain 
standard. B Corp certification is therefore regarded as a mark of trust for companies demonstrating 
high standards of social and environmental performance, but – given the lack of legal underpinning 
– the weakness remains in ‘the theoretical ease with which a company may unpick the credentials 
that made it a B Corp and revert to a more traditional modus operandi’ (Hunter, 2018: 258).  
 
In the US, several individual states have now introduced legislation enabling businesses to adopt 
the legal status of a ‘benefit corporation’, which has strong similarities with a B Corp, but also key 
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differences. As Hunter (2018: 264) notes: ‘the terminology is inevitably confusing, but one way to 
think about it is that B Corps must eventually meet the same legal standards as benefit corporations 
(i.e. through the legal test)’. In the US, the benefit corporation is distinguished from a traditional 
company through: (i) a general public benefit requirement (a benefit corporation must pursue ‘a 
material positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole, assessed against a third-
party standard’); (ii) a stakeholder-centric business model (whereby the company considers the 
effects of its actions not only on shareholders but also on employees, the local community, and the 
environment); (iii) reporting requirements (benefit corporations must produce an annual report 
detailing how their activities have met their general public benefit requirements, based on an 
independent third-party standard); and (iv) benefit directors (in some states, benefit corporations 
must have a benefit director on the board, with stringent conditions attached to their appointment 
to ensure objectivity and impartiality, who is responsible for overseeing all of the reporting 
requirements). 
 
These four factors could relatively easily be brought into English law, and a rough analogy can 
already be seen in the Community Interest Company (CIC). The test for whether a company is a CIC 
is similar to the first factor listed above, and is found at Section 35(2) of the Companies (Audit, 
Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004, which rather tautologically states that ‘a 
company satisfies the community interest test if a reasonable person might consider that its 
activities are being carried on for the benefit of the community’. The main difference between CICs 
and benefit corporations is that CICs are strictly not-for-profit. Nevertheless, the CIC legislation at 
Sections 26–63 of the 2004 Act could act as a useful template for a new type of benefit corporation. 
With particular regard to the third and fourth factors listed above (reporting requirements and 
benefit directors), Section 27 establishes a Regulator for Community Interest Companies, with 
powers granted under Sections 41 to 51. The Regulator has powers of investigation (s42), audit 
(s43), and can bring civil proceedings in the name of, and on behalf of, a CIC (s44). An equivalent 
regulator could be established with respect to benefit corporations, subject to similar, but more 
stringent, requirements. An executive arm might have the power to bring proceedings against 
benefit corporations who fail in their corporate obligations, just as the Insolvency Service does with 
ordinary corporations. A regulator would, however, need powers to investigate and act prior to the 
winding up of a benefit corporation. Such a regulator could form a constituent part of a new 
Business Commission (which we advocate in the following section).  
 
Despite some remaining weaknesses and objections, the steady proliferation of different corporate 
forms in the UK is encouraging an increasingly critical focus on the purpose of business. Whether it 
follows the specific nomenclature of the B Corp or the benefit corporation, there is room for a new 
legal form in the UK to express the principle of a ‘mission-led business’, or what Boerger and Hunter 
(2018) prefer to refer to as a ‘stakeholder company’. With reformulated directors’ duties, rigorous 
reporting requirements, and a robust and verifiable statement of purpose, such a business would be 
set apart from the standard for-profit corporation. As Hunter (2018: 261) concludes: ‘Over time, one 
would expect the cumulative effect of decision-making on this basis to have a significant impact on 
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7. Regulation and enforcement 
 
The regulation of business activity can occur at different levels and through a range of different 
mechanisms, from private regulation (voluntary management action), to soft law (code principles, 
recommendations, guidelines, etc.), through to hard law (government legislation). In recent 
decades, the ‘regulatory space’ for corporate governance in the UK has become decentred into a 
myriad of different regulatory bodies and principles (Vibert, 2014), the operation of which seeks to 
ensure high levels of autonomy for business and facilitate shareholder value. Whilst concerns with 
this approach have been consistently expressed, the various government reviews and reform 
initiatives over this period have left this neo-liberal, semi self-regulatory framework largely 
unchallenged (Moore and Petrin, 2017; Talbot, 2013). It remains the case that the corporation’s 
focus on maximising shareholder value at the expense of other considerations is in effect only 
constrained by adherence to codes of practice.  
 
The two essential characteristics of such codes are that they are voluntary and that their wording is 
ambiguous (and therefore open to interpretation). The injunction has been to either ‘comply’ or else 
‘explain’ why you are not complying, but this would only be a strong motivator for behaviour if non-
compliant explanations were subjected to rigorous analysis and reporting, but this is rarely the case. 
Explanations can be woefully inadequate, or simply not given at all, without repercussions of any 
kind (Hadden et al., 2014).The time has therefore come to acknowledge that voluntarism has 
largely failed, and to shift towards a more coherent and extensive regulatory regime, backed up 
with clear enforcement mechanisms. What unifies the regulatory changes we have proposed is 
progressive state policy, as the ‘glue’ binding reforms together, and so we suggest that a coherent 
form of ‘regulatory overlay’ will be required to facilitate this reform agenda. With sufficient political 
will, it is entirely open to governments to re-regulate the corporate governance framework, and UK 
company law could accommodate a stakeholder-oriented agenda if public policy shifted in that 
direction (Deakin, 2018). 
 
An historical perspective is useful here. As Ireland (2016, 2018) explains, a period of intensely 
financialized governance at the end of the 19th century and start of the 20th century was followed by 
a period of increasingly ‘socialised’ governance after World War Two – what we might now look 
back on as the halcyon years of social democracy. With organised labour strong, shareholders 
dispersed and weakened, and controls on capital movements in place, finance seemed to have been 
tamed. During this period, proposals for corporate governance reform were therefore muted, as 
many on the left did not think them necessary. However, as we have explained above, over the past 
forty years the rights and powers possessed by shareholders have been gradually enhanced – as a 
consequence of the relaxation of the rules governing the free movement of capital, the rise of 
global financial markets and new types of financial investment, and the waning power of organised 
labour. As a result, shareholders ‘have been increasingly able to use the residual proprietary rights 
attached to shares to (re)assert their power in and over the corporation … [both] directly in 
individual companies and indirectly on the corporate sector as a whole through financial markets … 
[and this has] propelled us back to a finance-capital-dominated world’ (Ireland, 2018: 29).  
 
Over recent decades we have therefore seen the emergence, as explained above, of an extractive 
form of capitalism, characterised by a short-termist and financialized form of governance. The point 
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is that it is the corporate legal form, as currently constituted, that has made these forms of 
governance possible. It is therefore in the reform of the corporate legal form where the possibility 
lies of a (re)turn to a more democratic and sustainable capitalism. Once again, there is nothing 
inevitable about the current institutional configuration. It is a product of political and economic 
choices, and these choices can be remade. As we have illustrated, financialization and 
marketization are not inevitable processes, but require a particular political and regulatory 
framework – ‘the marketization of corporate control does not take place in a political vacuum’ 
(Callaghan, 2015: 346). The rights and powers of shareholders and other capital investors are 
publicly granted and legally defined, meaning that they are also re-codable (CommonWealth, 2020; 
Pistor, 2017). 
 
We have sketched above several potential areas for reform – relating, for example, to the voting 
rights of investors, directors’ duties, executive pay, boardroom diversity, employee representation, 
and corporate form and purpose. Other areas for reform, which we have not covered in detail, 
relate to the wider institutional framework, and should also be considered. There have been 
regulatory deficiencies over decades, with too many weak regulatory bodies, conflicts of interest, 
and a lack of transparency. The ‘big four’ accountancy firms (KPMG, Deloitte, PWC, E&Y) have been 
too dominant. The Takeover Panel has been largely controlled by professional finance associations 
(e.g. ABI, CBI, UK Finance). Auditors have consistently failed to raise concerns (Carillion being 
perhaps the most egregious example), and lack sufficient independence and transparency. Lord 
Tyrie announced on 18th June 2020 that he was stepping down as chair of the Competition and 
Markets Authority, stating that the role prevented him from pursuing a more aggressive campaign 
for change. He had only served about two years of a five-year appointment. Taken together, a 
series of reforms is necessary to establish what Sikka et al. (2019) refer to as a ‘new regulatory 
architecture’ for business. 
  
Some of these reforms will only be effective if they are backed with adequate and enforceable 
sanctions. Take, for example, company directors. Currently there exists no satisfactory 
enforcement mechanism or sanctions for breach of duty. The duties of a director are only owed to 
the company and, under Section 170(1) of the Companies Act 2006, only the company can enforce 
them. This is clearly inadequate, as often there will be a conflict of interest between a director 
personally and the company. A company board will be very reluctant to launch proceedings against 
one of its directors or former directors. In certain very limited circumstances a shareholder can 
launch proceedings for breach of duty. However, as this involves bringing litigation, the procedure is 
complicated and expensive. Moreover, if a claimant is successful, they are only entitled to damages 
under civil law. There is thus no criminal liability under the Companies Act 2006 for mis-
management of the company in breach of directors’ duties. In most cases, if a director acts in good 
faith, the courts are unlikely to substitute their own judgement for that of the director. There is, 
however, a big gap in remedies when that is not the case. There is therefore a strong argument for 
extending a company director’s ‘duty of care’ to reach beyond shareholders to benefit all 
stakeholders. 
 
Directors can already be held criminally liable under other Acts of Parliament – for example the 
Insolvency Act 1986, the Theft Act 1968 (for theft and fraud), the Bribery Act 2010 (for failure to 
prevent corporate corruption), the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (for market abuse) – 
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and also laws relating to health and safety, anti-trust, environmental protection, and data 
protection. Further, directors are liable under the Companies Act 2006 for breach of regulatory 
filing of documents, and can be disqualified under the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, 
which is a statutory criminal offence. Whilst these statutes deal mainly with the consequences of 
financial loss, there is no reason why in extremis company management in breach of duty to 
company stakeholders should not be visited with a similar sanction. No one would suggest that 
issues relating to the conduct of business should be subject to frequent direct legal or judicial 
intervention, and it is not expected that introducing criminal liability for company mis-management 
would bring a flood of criminal litigation and expose directors to unnecessary risk, but there are 
nonetheless legal improvements that can be made (Hockman, 2014). There is scope for the creation 
of additional criminal offences, not necessarily involving proof of deliberate dishonesty. One 
example might be the creation of an offence of recklessly managing a company. The real question is 
whether the threat would act as an effective deterrent against acting in breach of duty.  
 
Accordingly, we suggest that new rights are needed – for the board, for shareholders, and for other 
stakeholders – and that a new regulator with enforcement powers should be established, to 
monitor adherence and take action for breach of duty. The new regulator shall perhaps be named 
the Business Commission, and would oversee standards among both listed and private companies, 
acting as an independent regulator with investigative powers and legal remedies for non-
compliance. The Business Commission should have the power to intervene at the behest of 
shareholders and stakeholders for mis-management. Similar structures exist, for example, for 
finance (the Financial Services Authority) and for solicitors (the Solicitors Regulation Authority). 
Whilst the widening of the duties of directors should apply to all companies, there should be a 
minimum threshold, either based on number of employees or annual turnover, to exempt SMEs 
from intervention by the Commission. This is also an access to justice issue, and all of a company’s 
stakeholders should have a protecting authority to deter directors from acting in breach of duty, 
and also a right to intervene. The intention of these new rules would not be to penalise firms in a 
punitive way, but rather to encourage responsible business practices, whilst making the deliberate 
evasion of responsibility a riskier endeavour. Far from stifling business growth, this framework 
would also provide greater clarity and confidence to investors. 
 
8. Conclusion  
 
As a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, the UK economy has experienced a sudden and deep 
disruption that will have lasting consequences. Legal and regulatory frameworks will need to adapt 
in response to rapidly changing expectations. If we wish to ‘build back better’, then, as the Financial 
Times put it in a recent impassioned editorial: ‘Radical reforms – reversing the prevailing policy 
direction of the last four decades – will need to be put on the table. Governments will have to accept 
a more active role in the economy … Beyond the public health war, true leaders will mobilise now to 
win the peace’ (FT, 2020). In this context, the arguments for intervention to encourage business 
models that are more democratic and sustainable will only grow stronger, and there is a positive 
role for corporate governance reform in facilitating this.  
 
Currently the role of capital markets and financial intermediaries pressures firms towards short-
term and dysfunctional business decisions, reducing the scope for re-investment and re-skilling. The 
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corporate governance framework should therefore be re-configured to support responsible 
business, facilitate the delivery of long-term and sustainable economic growth, and provide an 
overarching regulatory framework within which good businesses can thrive. This framework must 
be welcoming to investors, with shareholders incentivised to act as a force for socialisation rather 
than as extractive rentiers. At the same time, the governance of corporations must reflect the reality 
of the firm as a political entity consisting of multiple constituencies who share overlapping 
economic and political claims on its resources, and acknowledge the legitimate interests of all the 
stakeholders involved in or affected by its operations.  
 
This report has sought to establish some of the options for reform, sketch out those policy areas 
that will need attention from a progressive Labour government, and offer a narrative and 
vocabulary for taking these arguments forward. We have focussed on the key actors in corporate 
governance – shareholders, directors, employees – as well as certain aspects of the broader 
regulatory architecture for business. Taken together, our proposals are consistent with an 
increasingly mainstream set of arguments for state-led reform, reflecting current debates 
concerning the potential of the ‘entrepreneurial state’ to co-create and co-shape markets 
(Mazzucato, 2013, 2018), and recognising that ‘corporate governance … constitutes a field of 
contention that allows for political intervention in pursuit of economic and social objectives’ (Driver 
and Thompson, 2018: 2). It is also clear that the decline in bargaining power of workers continues to 
hold back economic recovery, and was one of the principal causes of the financial crisis, with rising 
household debt used to compensate for stagnating real wages (Hockman, 2014). A more 
democratic and sustainable capitalism must therefore also address income inequality, for reasons of 
both social justice and economic stability (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010). Rebuilding the workplace 
institutions that influence the initial distribution of incomes (before the tax and benefits system 
intervenes) will be an equally important aspect of policy development. We intend to address these 
issues in a further report focusing on workplace employment relations and employment law reform. 
 
There is a broad recognition across the political spectrum that some transformation of capitalism is 
desirable. The challenge for the Labour Party is to advance a renewed vision of democratic socialist 
reform, with an active state working in partnership with businesses, workers, and their trade unions. 
Since his election as leader in April 2020, Sir Keir Starmer has referred to the 2019 Labour Party 
manifesto as a ‘foundation document’ for policy development. It contained many of the kinds of 
policies suggested in this report (e.g. limits on short-term shareholdings, restrictions on voting in 
takeovers, one third of board seats for workers, broadening the ownership base of firms, and ending 
the corporate capture of regulatory institutions). We now need to build on this foundation, in the 
context of a rapidly changing economic landscape. After a set of timid and toothless interventions 
from the Conservative government, Labour must progress the agenda on corporate governance 
reform, as part of a wider vision of a democratic and sustainable economy. Attitudes towards 
capitalism and the role of business are shifting rapidly. Labour must show itself to be leading and 











ACAS (2018) Response to Corporate Governance Code Consultation, London: Advisory, Conciliation and 
Arbitration Service. 
 
Appelbaum, E., Batt, R. and Clark, I. (2013) Implications of financial capitalism for employment relations 
research: Evidence from breach of trust and implicit contracts in private equity buyouts, British Journal of 
Industrial Relations, 51 (3), 498–518. 
 
Armour, J., Deakin, S. and Konzelmann, S. (2003) Shareholder primacy and the trajectory of UK corporate 
governance, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 41 (3), 531–555. 
 
Ashley, L. and Empson, L. (2017) Understanding social exclusion in elite professional service firms: Field level 
dynamics and the ‘professional project’, Work, Employment and Society, 31 (2), 211–229. 
 
Bailey, D. (2020) Guest editorial: Shaping the ‘new normal’, Renewal: A Journal of Social Democracy, 28 (2), 5–
14. 
 
BEIS (2015) Improving the Gender Balance on British Boards: Women on Boards Davies Review Five Year 
Summary, London: Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. 
 
BEIS (2017) Corporate Governance Reform: The Government Response to the Green Paper Consultation, London: 
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. 
 
Big Innovation Centre (2017) The Purposeful Company: Executive Remuneration Report, London: Big Innovation 
Centre. 
 
Blakeley, G. (2019) Stolen: How To Save The World From Financialization, London: Repeater Books. 
 
Boeger, N. and Hunter, D. (2018) Mission-led Business: CSR Reboot or Paradigm Shift?, Bristol Law Research 
Paper Series No. 2018: 001. 
 
Boeger, N. and Villiers, C. (eds.) (2018) Shaping the Corporate Landscape: Towards Corporate Reform and 
Enterprise Diversity, Oxford: Hart Publishing.  
 
British Academy (2019) Principles for Purposeful Business: How to Deliver the Framework for the Future of the 
Corporation, London: British Academy. 
 
Brown, R. McQuaid, R., Raeside, R., Dutton, M., Egdell, V. and Canduela, J. (2019) Buying into capitalism? 
Employee ownership in a disconnected era, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 57 (1), 62–85. 
 
Cabinet Office (2016) On a Mission in the UK Economy: Current State of Play, Vision and Recommendations from 
the Advisory Panel to the Mission-led Business Review 2016, London: HM Government. 
 
Callaghan, H. (2015) Who cares about financialization? Self-reinforcing feedback, issue salience, and 
increasing acquiescence to market-enabling takeover rules, Socio-Economic Review, 13 (2), 331–350. 
 
CIPD (2015) Gender Diversity in the Boardroom: Reach For The Top, London: Chartered Institute of Personnel 
and Development. 
 
Towards Democratic and Sustainable Business: Possibilities for Corporate Governance Reform    33 
July 2020 
CIPD (2017) Creating and Capturing Value at Work: Who Benefits?, London: Chartered Institute of Personnel 
and Development. 
 
CIPD / High Pay Centre (2019) RemCo Reform: Governing Successful Organisations that Benefit Everyone, 
London: Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development 
 
Clark, I. (2009) Owners and managers: Disconnecting managerial capitalism? Understanding the private-
equity business model, Work, Employment and Society, 23 (4), 775– 86. 
 
Clark, I. (2016) Financialization, ownership and employee interests under private equity at the AA, part two, 
Industrial Relations Journal, 47 (3), 238–252. 
 
Clark, I. and Macey, R. (2015) Is financialization contagious? What role do HR practices play in the capture of 










CommonWealth (2020) Commoning The Company, London: CommonWealth. 
 
Crane, A., Palazzo, G., Spence, L.J. and Matten, D. (2014) Contesting the value of ‘creating shared value’, 
California Management Review, 56 (2), 130–53. 
 
Cullen, J., Mähönen, J. and Rapp Nilsen, H. (2020) Financing the Transition to Sustainability: SMART Reform 
Proposals, University of Oslo Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2020–10. 
 
Cushen, J. and Thompson, P. (2016) Financialization and value: Why labour and the labour process still 
matter, Work, Employment and Society, 30 (2), 352–365. 
 
Davis, A., Offenbach, D., Stevens, R. and Grant, N. (2013) Takeovers and the Public Interest: Responsible 
Capitalism in Practice, Policy Network Paper, London: Policy Network. 
 
Deakin, S. (2014) Against Shareholder Empowerment, in Beyond Shareholder Value: The Reasons and Choices 
For Corporate Governance Reform, London: Trades Union Congress. 
 
Deakin, S. (2018) Reversing Financialization: Shareholder Value and the Legal Reform of Corporate 
Governance, in Driver, C. and Thompson, G. (eds.) Corporate Governance in Contention, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Deakin, S., Hobbs, R., Konzelmann, S. and Wilkinson, F. (2002) Partnership, ownership and control: The 
impact of corporate governance on employment relations, Employee Relations, 24 (3), 335–352. 
 
Dobbins, T. (2020) Covid-19 and the Past, Present and Future of Work, Futures of Work, Issue 13, Bristol: 
Bristol University Press. 
 
Dobbins, T. and Dundon, T. (2017) The chimera of sustainable labour–management partnership, British 
Journal of Management, 28, 519–33. 
 
Driver, C. and Thompson, G. (2018) Corporate Governance and Why It Matters, in Driver, C. and Thompson, 
G. (eds.) Corporate Governance in Contention, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Towards Democratic and Sustainable Business: Possibilities for Corporate Governance Reform    34 
July 2020 




Ferreras, I. (2017) Firms as Political Entities: Saving Democracy Through Economic Bicameralism, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Ferreras, I. (2019) Democratising Firms: A Cornerstone of Shared and Sustainable Prosperity, ESRC Centre For 
The Understanding of Sustainable Prosperity. 
 





FRC (2018) The UK Corporate Governance Code: July 2018, London: Financial Reporting Council. 
 
FRC (2020) Annual Review of the UK Corporate Governance Code, London: Financial Reporting Council. 
 
FT (2020) Virus lays bare the frailty of the social contract: Radical reforms are required to forge a society that 




Gold, M. (2011) ‘Taken on board’: An evaluation of the influence of employee board-level representatives on 
company decision-making across Europe, European Journal of Industrial Relations, 17 (1), 41–56. 
 
Gold, M. and Rees, C. (forthcoming) The regulation of takeover bids in the UK: An evaluation of provisions for 
employee involvement, Economic and Industrial Democracy. [published online September 2018] 
 
Gold, M. and Waddington, J. (2019) Board-level employee representation in Europe: State of play, European 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 25 (3), 205–218. 
 





Gospel, H., Pendleton, A. and Vitols, S. (2014) Financialization, New Investment Funds and Labour: An 
International Comparison, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Grady, J. and Simms, M. (2019) Trade unions and the challenge of fostering solidarities in an era of 
financialization, Economic and Industrial Democracy, 40 (3), 490–510. 
 
Hadden, T., Ireland, P., Morgan, G., Parker, M., Pearson, G., Picciotto, S., Sikka, P. and Willmott, H. (2014) 
Fighting Corporate Abuse: Beyond Predatory Capitalism, London: Pluto Press. 
 
Haldane, A. (2015) Who owns a company?, University of Edinburgh Corporate Finance Conference, 22
nd
 May.  
 
Haldane, A. (2016) The Costs of Short-Termism, in Jacobs, M. and Mazzucato, M. (eds.) Rethinking Capitalism: 
Economics and Policy for Sustainable and Inclusive Growth, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 
 
Hall, M. and Purcell, J. (2012) Consultation at Work: Regulation and Practice, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 




High Pay Centre (2015) Pay Ratios: Just Do It, London: High Pay Centre. 
 
Towards Democratic and Sustainable Business: Possibilities for Corporate Governance Reform    35 
July 2020 
High Pay Centre (2020) Rethinking Reward: Analysis of 2020 Pay Ratio Disclosures (interim report, June), 
London: High Pay Centre. 
 
Hockman, S. (2012) Legislating For Responsible Capitalism, Policy Network Paper, London: Policy Network. 
 
Hockman, S. (2014) Responsible Capitalism: What It Means In Practice, in Hockman, S. (ed.) Law Reform 2015: 
A Manifesto For Change, London: Profile Books. 
 
Horn, L. (2017) The Financialization of the Corporation, in Baars, G. and Spicer, A. (eds.) The Corporation, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hunter, D. (2018) The Arrival of B Corps in Britain: Another Milestone Towards a More Nuanced Economy?, in 
Boeger, N. and Villiers, C. (eds.) Shaping the Corporate Landscape: Towards Corporate Reform and Enterprise 
Diversity, Oxford: Hart Publishing.  
 
ICAEW (2018) How Employee Directors Add Value, London: Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales. 
 
ICGN (2020) Letter to Corporate Leaders: Governance Priorities During the Covid-19 Pandemic, International 




ICSA (2017) The Future of Governance: Untangling Corporate Governance, London: Institute of Chartered 
Secretaries and Administrators. 
 
IPA / Tomorrow’s Company (2012) Releasing Voice for Sustainable Business Success, London: Involvement and 
Participation Association. 
 
IPPR (2018) Prosperity and Justice: A Plan for the New Economy, London: Institute for Public Policy Research.  
 
IPPR (2020) Transforming the Economy after Covid-19: A Clean, Fair and Resilient Recovery, London: Institute 
for Public Policy Research.  
 
Ireland, P. (1999) Company law and the myth of shareholder ownership, Modern Law Review, 62 (1), 32–57. 
 
Ireland, P. (2016) The Corporation and the New Aristocracy of Finance, in J-P Robe, A. Lyon-Caen and S. 
Vernac (eds.) Constitutionalization of the World-Power System, Abingdon: Routledge. 
 
Ireland, P. (2018) Corporate Schizophrenia: The Institutional Origins of Corporate Social Irresponsibility, in 
Boeger, N. and Villiers, C. (eds.) Shaping the Corporate Landscape: Towards Corporate Reform and Enterprise 
Diversity, Oxford: Hart Publishing.  
 
Jacobs, M. and Mazzucato, M. (eds.) (2016) Rethinking Capitalism: Economics and Policy For Sustainable and 
Inclusive Growth, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 
 
Johnston, A. (2017) The shrinking scope of CSR in UK corporate law, Washington and Lee Law Review, 74 (2), 
1001–1042. 
 
Johnston, A. and Njoya, W. (2014) Employee Voice in Corporate Control Transactions, in Bogg, A. and Novitz, 
T. (eds.) Voices at Work: Continuity and Change in the Common Law World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Towards Democratic and Sustainable Business: Possibilities for Corporate Governance Reform    36 
July 2020 
Johnston, A. and Sjåfjell, B. (2019) The EU’s Approach to Environmentally Sustainable Business: Can 
Disclosure Overcome the Failings of Shareholder Primacy?, University of Oslo Faculty of Law Legal Studies 
Research Paper, No. 2019–60. 
 
Johnstone, S. (2015) The Case for Workplace Partnership, in Johnstone, S. and Ackers, P. (eds.) Finding a Voice 
at Work: New Perspectives on Employment Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Johnstone, S., Saridakis, G. and Wilkinson, A. (2019) The global financial crisis, work and employment: Ten 
years on, Economic and Industrial Democracy, 40 (3), 455–468. 
 
Kay, J. (2012) The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision-Making, London: Department of 
Business, Innovation and Skills. 
 




LAPFF (2019) Employees on Boards: Modernising Governance, London: Local Authority Pension Fund Forum. 
 
Lawrence, M. (2017) Corporate Governance Reform: Turning Business Towards Long-term Success, London: 
Institute for Public Policy Research. 
 
Lazonick, W. (2016) Innovative Enterprise and the Theory of the Firm, in Jacobs, M. and Mazzucato, M. (eds.) 
Rethinking Capitalism: Economics and Policy For Sustainable and Inclusive Growth, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 
 





Mazzucato, M. (2013) The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs Private Sector Myths, London: Anthem. 
 
Mazzucato, M. (2018) The Value of Everything: Making and Taking in the Global Economy, London: Allen Lane.  
 








Moore, M. and Petrin, M. (2017) Corporate Governance: Law, Regulation and Theory, London: Palgrave. 
 




NEF (2017) Shareholder Capitalism: A System in Crisis, London: New Economics Foundation. 
 
NEF (2018) Co-operatives Unleashed, London: New Economics Foundation. 
 
NEF (2020) Change The Rules: New Rules for the Economy, London: New Economics Foundation. 
 
Pendleton, A. (2016) The Employment Effects of Takeovers, in Cremers, J. and Vitols, S. (eds.) Takeovers With 




Towards Democratic and Sustainable Business: Possibilities for Corporate Governance Reform    37 
July 2020 
Pendleton, A. and Gospel, H. (2014) Financialization, New Investment Funds and Weakened Labour: The Case 
of the UK, in Gospel, H., Pendleton, A. and Vitols, S. (eds.) Financialization, New Investment Funds and Labour, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Pistor, K. (2019) The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Porter, M.E. and Kramer, M.R. (2011) Creating shared value, Harvard Business Review, 89 (1/2), 62–77. 
 
Powdrill, T. (2018) Labour and Capital blog, available at http://labourandcapital.blogspot.com/ 
 




Rees, C. (2019) Worker directors increasingly prominent in debates on corporate governance reform, 
Involvement and Participation Association (IPA) e-Bulletin, May. 
 
Robé, J-P. (2011) The legal structure of the firm, Accounting, Economics and Law, 1 (1), Article 5. 
 
Sengupta, S., Whitfield, K. and McNabb, B. (2007) Employee share ownership and performance: Golden path 
or golden handcuffs? International Journal of Human Resource Management, 18 (8), 1507–1538. 
 
Sengupta, S. and Yoon, Y (2018) Moderating effect of pay dispersion on the relationship between employee 
share ownership and labor productivity, Human Resource Management, 57, 1083–1096. 
 
Sikka, P. (2008) Corporate governance: What about the workers?, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability 
Journal, 21 (7), 955–977. 
 
Sikka, P. et al. (2019) Regulatory Architecture to Enhance Democracy and Business Accountability, Report for 
the Labour Party, January. 
 
Sjåfjell, B. (2018) Redefining the corporation for a sustainable new economy, Journal of Law and Society, 45 
(1), 29–45. 
 
Stern, S. (2018) Good Pay and Good Work, in Working Well: Perspectives on Good Work and Why It Matters, 
London: Involvement and Participation Association. 
 
Stiglitz, J. (2016) Inequality and Economic Growth, in Jacobs, M. and Mazzucato, M. (eds.) Rethinking 
Capitalism: Economics and Policy For Sustainable and Inclusive Growth, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 
 
Talbot, L. (2013) Progressive Corporate Governance for the 21st Century, London: Routledge. 
 
Talbot, L. (2016) Trying to change the world with company law? Some problems, Legal Studies, 36 (3), 513–
534. 
 
Talbot, L. (2020) Corporate Governance and the Political Economy of the Company, in Sjåfjell, B. and Bruner, 
C.M. (eds.) The Cambridge Handbook of Corporate Law, Corporate Governance and Sustainability, Cambridge: 




Towards Democratic and Sustainable Business: Possibilities for Corporate Governance Reform    38 
July 2020 
Thompson, P. (2003) Disconnected capitalism: Or why employers can’t keep their side of the bargain, Work, 
Employment and Society, 17 (2), 359–78. 
 
Thompson, P. (2013) Financialization and the workplace: Extending and applying the disconnected capitalism 
thesis, Work, Employment and Society, 27 (3), 472–488. 
 
Tomorrow’s Company (2016) Bringing Employee Voice Into The Boardroom, London: Tomorrow’s Company. 
 
Tricker, B. (2015) Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices (3
rd
 edition), Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
TUC (2014) Beyond Shareholder Value: The Reasons and Choices For Corporate Governance Reform, London: 
Trades Union Congress. 
 
TUC (2016) All Aboard: Making Worker Representation On Company Boards a Reality, London: Trades Union 
Congress. 
 
TUC (2018) Corporate Governance Code Consultation: TUC Response, London: Trades Union Congress. 
 
TUC (2020) A Better Recovery: Learning the Lessons of the Corona Crisis to Create a Stronger, Fairer Economy, 
London: Trades Union Congress. 
 
Veldman, J., Gregor, F. and Morrow, P. (2016) Corporate Governance For a Changing World: Report of a Global 
Roundtable Series, Brussels and London: Frank Bold and Cass Business School. 
 
Veldman, J. and Willmott, H. (2016) The cultural grammar of governance: The UK code of corporate 
governance, reflexivity, and the limits of ‘soft’ regulation, Human Relations, 69 (3), 581–603. 
 
Vibert, F. (2014) The New Regulatory Space: Reframing Democratic Governance, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Vitols, S. and Kluge, N. (eds.) (2011) The Sustainable Company: A New Approach to Corporate Governance, 
Brussels: European Trade Union Institute. 
 
Waddington, J. and Conchon, A. (2016) Board‐level Employee Representation in Europe: Priorities, Power and 
Articulation, London: Routledge. 
 
Wilkinson, R. and Pickett, K. (2010) The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone (2
nd
 edition), London: 
Penguin. 
 
Williamson, J. (2018) Beyond Shareholder Primacy: The Case for Workers’ Voice in Corporate Governance, in 
Boeger, N. and Villiers, C. (eds.) Shaping the Corporate Landscape: Towards Corporate Reform and Enterprise 
Diversity, Oxford: Hart Publishing.  
  
 


















Chris Rees is Professor of Employment Relations at Royal Holloway, University of London. His 
published research has covered a range of topics, with a particular focus on employee participation 
and representation, mergers and takeovers, and corporate responsibility. He is currently engaged in 
a study of corporate governance and employee voice in large UK firms, in collaboration with the 
Involvement and Participation Association. 
 
David Offenbach is a solicitor and a vice president of Labour Business. He is a former Camden 
Councillor and parliamentary candidate. He is a former non-executive director of listed public and 

















The authors are grateful to Mark Soames and Sukanya Sengupta for comments on and input to a previous 
draft of this report. 
 
